Wittgenstein’s Argument on the Mind-body Problem and the Essence of Mind
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Lu Yuanzhong
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Ludwig Wittgenstein’s unique construct of the philosophy of language has been one of the greatest theories among the realm of logical empiricism. Despite the fundamental contributions Wittgenstein’s has made to the later post-modernist philosophy and the contemporary discussion on the relationship between algorithmic design and human-driven discourses, Wittgenstein’s philosophical construct has greatly influenced the philosophy of mind, modern contemporary science, and of course, the classical philosophical topic of the mind-body problem.
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Authors
Lu Yuanzhong
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References:
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