Judgment as the Bridge Between Spectator and Actor: A Refutation of Beiner’s Interpretation of Arendt
Arendt’s theory of judgment has puzzled her readers for a long time. Beiner and other scholars believe that Arendt has two different kinds of theories of judgment, and they also believe that the theory of judgment in Arendt’s later writings indicates that she has shifted her focus from action to mind. But this view is a misreading of Arendt. Arendt’s working always focus on the question “how can we act morally”, and there is only one theory of judgment for Arendt.
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