John Locke and Descartes refute on Hume’s concept of self
Authors
Meifan Zhu
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Annotation
In many literary works, the characters transform into a “new man”. For example, Tom Joads in Grapes of Wrath is transformed from a selfish character who prioritizes his own survival under the social background of the Great Depression. After traveling with his family to California. Young Joads gradually become sober towards the suffering of lower class Americans, turning into a righteous man who fights for social justice. Nevertheless, I disagree with the concept “new man”, because despite the ceaseless stream of time and transformative experiences we undergo, our personal essence is constant through time. Meaning that we do not form a complete new self through the transformation of time and experience. To understand this we will be examining the concepts of personal identity defined by memory and consciousness throughout the period of human life. Locke believes that experiences form a human being, and that the concept of individual consciousness will demonstrate the inherent continuity and persistence of the self that are presented through a comprehensive understanding of nature’s capacity for transformation over the span of time. Therefore factors such as individual perceptions and impressions in shaping one's sense of self, along with the influence of moral development and virtue on individual identity do not alter the core of identity. Indeed, Descartes, who views the human consciousness as the only object that holds true in the universe, agrees that we are not able to perceive the objective truth. The view point we will argue is in contrast to that of Hume and his bundle theory of identity; we will, therefore, first give an exposition on Hume’s critique of a stable personal identity, which it separated into qualitatively identify, and numerical identity.
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Authors
Meifan Zhu
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