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NETWORK COLLABORATION FAILURE OF GLOBAL SPORTS GOVERNANCE AND CHINA'S EMPOWERMENT STRATEGY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION DILEMMA

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Abstract

Against the backdrop of rising anti-globalization, regional conflicts and the resurgence of nationalism, global sports governance is trapped in intertwined crises involving doping scandals, organizational corruption, gender disputes and external political intervention. The polycentric network constituted by sovereign states, international sports organizations and global sports industry groups is plagued by prominent collective action dilemmas, including widespread free-riding, fragmented network linkage, unbalanced power structure and difficult interest coordination. Adopting a literature review method, this study takes network governance theory as the core analytical framework to clarify the connotation and structural characteristics of the global sports governance network. It systematically explores the typical manifestations, internal formation mechanisms and logical evolution paths of network collaboration failure in global sports governance. From the dimensions of stakeholder interest games, network trust deficits and insufficient institutional incentive constraints, this paper further excavates the deep-rooted causes of collaborative failure. Guided by the vision of a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind and based on the practical path of Chinese-style sports modernization, this study constructs a multi-dimensional empowerment strategy for China to promote the optimization and reconstruction of the global sports governance network. Specific approaches include establishing network trust mechanisms, designing selective incentive systems, promoting multi-stakeholder collaborative rule-making, and improving network supervision and evaluation systems. This research aims to break through the collective action dilemma of global sports governance, resolve the deadlock of network collaboration failure, provide theoretical references for advancing the reform of global sports governance system, and offer a feasible

Chinese solution for realizing balanced, inclusive and sustainable development of global sports governance.

Keywords: *Collective Action Dilemma; Network Governance; Global Sports Governance; Collaborative Failure; China's Empowerment Strategy; Community with a Shared Future for Mankind*

1. Introduction

1.1 Research Background

The evolution of globalization and anti-globalization trends has profoundly reshaped the international political, economic and cultural landscape, bringing profound structural transformation to the field of global sports governance (Chadwick, S., 2022). As an essential component of global public governance, global sports governance undertakes core functions such as standardizing international sports order, resolving transnational sports public affairs, and coordinating the interests of diverse stakeholders (Dowling, M., Leopkey, B., & Smith, L., 2018). Nevertheless, the contemporary global sports system is continuously troubled by structural defects and operational disorder, including irregular internal operation of international sports organizations, the global spread of doping problems, rampant match-fixing and industrial monopoly, and increasing political intervention in major sports events (Kihl, L. A., Skinner, J., & Engelberg, T., 2017; Lee, K. M., & Hassim, J. Z., 2023). These phenomena have seriously undermined the authority and operational efficiency of the existing global sports governance system (Peeters, T., & Szymanski, S., 2014).

Major international events such as the Paris Olympics have exposed inconsistencies in international anti-doping rules, poor coordination among international sports organizations, and excessive intervention of national forces in sports affairs (Pielke Jr, R., & Boye, E., 2019; Cao, L., 2024). This incident reflects the lack of unified norms and collaborative supervision among network nodes, which serves as a typical embodiment of collective action dilemma and network collaboration failure (Kusumasari, B., Sajida, S., Santoso, A. D., & Fauzi, F. Z., 2024). Different from traditional hierarchical governance models, global sports governance presents obvious polycentric network characteristics, in which multiple independent actors coexist and interact, including sovereign states, the

International Olympic Committee, international sports federations, global sports industry groups and sports non-governmental organizations (Chappelet, J. L., 2020). Since no super-sovereign authoritative institution exists within this network, each governance actor holds distinct interest demands and behavioral preferences, pushing the global sports governance network into a typical collective action dilemma (Sugden, J. T., Sheps, S., & Sugden, J., 2023).

Widespread free-riding, deliberate responsibility evasion, interest gaming among participants and fragmented cooperative relations have become major obstacles restricting the effective operation of global sports governance (Dietl, H., Özdemir, A., & Rendall, A., 2020; De Bock, T., Scheerder, J., Theeboom, M., De Clerck, T., Constandt, B., & Willem, A., 2023). Inherent deficiencies such as unbalanced power structure, insufficient mutual trust among network nodes and missing institutional constraints directly lead to extensive network collaboration failure (Burton, N., Chadwick, S., Widdop, P., & Bond, A., 2024). Meanwhile, existing academic studies mostly focus on phenomenon description and case analysis of global sports governance crises (Fahlen, J., & Stenling, C., 2020). Few researches conduct in-depth theoretical interpretation on the internal mechanism of collaborative failure from the perspective of collective action dilemma, and a systematic analytical framework based on network governance theory remains absent (Peng, Q., Dickson, G., Scelles, N., Grix, J., & Brannagan, P. M., 2020). Therefore, it is necessary to explore the logical formation of network collaboration failure and construct targeted optimization strategies.

1.2 Research Significance

1.2.1 Theoretical Significance

This study introduces collective action dilemma theory and network governance theory into the research domain of global sports governance, breaking the limitation of traditional single institutional analysis.

It constructs a complete analytical paradigm of “collective action dilemma–network structure–collaborative failure”, clarifying the internal correlation between polycentric network characteristics and collective action predicament in global sports governance. The research expands the application boundary of network governance theory in international sports research and makes up for the deficiency of theoretical depth and systematic framework in existing literature. Furthermore, it integrates the concept of a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind into the network governance analytical system, realizing the organic combination of Western mainstream governance theory and Chinese indigenous governance concepts, and enriching the theoretical connotation of global sports governance research.

1.2.2 Practical Significance

This study systematically sorts out the realistic manifestations and underlying causes of network collaboration failure in global sports governance, and identifies interest conflicts and structural barriers among multiple governance actors. The proposed targeted empowerment strategies can provide practical references for China to participate in global sports governance, enhance the discourse power and influence of developing countries in international sports affairs, and promote the reform of the unreasonable and unbalanced global sports governance pattern. In addition, the research conclusions can offer implications for international sports organizations to optimize network collaboration mechanisms, alleviate collective action dilemmas, and achieve sound operation and sustainable development of global sports governance.

1.3 Research Methods and Research Framework

1.3.1 Research Methods

Literature Review Method: By sorting out domestic and foreign literature concerning global sports governance, network governance theory and collective action dilemma (Dowling, M., Leopkey, B., & Smith, L., 2018; Shilbury, D., O’Boyle, I., & Ferkins, L., 2016), this study clarifies the core connotation, research progress and logical correlation of relevant concepts, laying a solid theoretical foundation for follow-up analysis.

Theoretical Analysis Method: Taking network governance theory and collective action dilemma theory as core analytical tools, this paper analyzes the structural composition, node relations and operational logic of the global sports governance network (Trivellato, B., Cristofoli, D., Galizzi, G., Sicilia, M., & Steccolini, I., 2025; Lubell, M., & Morrison, T. H., 2021), and explores the formation mechanism and evolutionary path of network collaboration failure.

Logical Induction and Deduction Method: This study summarizes the common characteristics and inherent laws of collaborative failure in the global sports governance network, deduces the restrictive factors triggering collective action dilemmas (Meier, H. E., & Garcia, B., 2015), and further constructs China’s multi-dimensional empowerment strategy for optimizing global sports governance network (Zheng, J., Chen, S., Tan, T. C., & Lau, P. W. C., 2018).

1.3.2 Research Framework

The research consists of six main sections. The first section is the introduction, elaborating the research background, significance, methods and overall framework. The second section defines core concepts and theoretical basis. The third section analyzes the realistic manifestations and classification of network collaboration failure in global sports governance. The fourth section explores the formation mechanism of network collaboration failure based on collective action dilemma. The fifth section constructs China’s empowerment strategies to resolve collaborative failure. The sixth section presents research conclusions, limitations and future prospects.

1.4 Research Innovation

(1) **Innovation of theoretical perspective.** Different from existing studies focusing on institutional reform and case interpretation, this research takes collective action dilemma as the entry point and embeds network governance theory into the analysis of global sports governance, revealing the inherent network logic behind governance failure.

(2) **Innovation of mechanism analysis.** This paper constructs a logical transmission framework of network node imbalance, trust deficit, institutional absence, collective action dilemma and collaborative failure,

deeply analyzing the internal evolution path of global sports governance network failure and making up for the shallow phenomenon-oriented analysis of previous studies.

(3) **Innovation of strategy construction.** Based on the inherent operational rules of network governance, this research designs China's multi-dimensional empowerment paths from the perspectives of trust construction, incentive optimization, rule coordination and network supervision.

2. Core Concept Definition and Theoretical Basis

2.1 Core Concept Definition

2.1.1 Global Sports Governance Network

The global sports governance network refers to a polycentric, relational and open network system formed by multiple independent stakeholders including sovereign states, international sports organizations, global sports industry groups and sports non-governmental organizations. All participants gather around transnational sports public affairs such as rule formulation, event operation, anti-doping management and organizational governance. Without an absolute central authoritative node, all stakeholders maintain interdependent and interactive relations through equal consultation, interest gaming and cooperative negotiation, presenting typical structural characteristics of decentralization, multi-node participation and relational linkage.

2.1.2 Collective Action Dilemma

Collective action dilemma indicates that when multiple rational actors face public affairs, individual rational choices driven by self-interest eventually lead to collective irrational outcomes, due to the non-excludable and non-competitive attributes of public goods. Typical manifestations include widespread free-riding, deliberate responsibility evasion, high cooperative cost and difficulty in reaching consensus. In the global sports governance network, each actor is driven by self-interest and tends to enjoy public benefits brought by global sports governance without bearing corresponding governance costs, which hinders collective cooperation and triggers network operational failure.

2.1.3 Network Collaboration Failure

Network collaboration failure means that under the polycentric structure of global sports governance, multiple governance actors fail to form effective cooperative synergy due to interest divergence, power imbalance, trust deficiency and institutional defects. It is manifested as blocked communication among network nodes, difficult coordination of interest demands, low efficiency of joint governance, and inability to effectively solve transnational sports public problems, further resulting in governance inefficiency, market failure and institutional failure.

2.2 Theoretical Basis

2.2.1 Network Governance Theory

Network governance theory emerged amid the development of globalization and social diversification, differing from traditional hierarchical governance and market governance. It emphasizes that public affairs are jointly managed by multiple equal and interdependent actors through negotiation, cooperation and consultation. Its core logic breaks the single top-down control model and focuses on relational connection, power balance and trust interaction among network nodes. Core elements include network nodes, relational connection mechanism, interest distribution rules and network supervision mechanism, which are highly compatible with the polycentric operational characteristics of global sports governance.

2.2.2 Collective Action Dilemma Theory

Collective action dilemma theory proposes that rational individuals prioritize self-interest in collective public affairs, and the non-excludable attribute of public goods provides inherent motivation for free-riding behavior. The more participants involved in collective affairs, the harder it is to reach consensus and implement effective cooperation. In global sports governance, the large number of network nodes, scattered interest demands and lack of mandatory binding rules create objective conditions for free-riding, which constitutes the core theoretical root of network collaboration failure.


2.2.3 Theoretical Coupling Mechanism

There exists natural logical coupling between network governance theory and collective action dilemma theory in the research of global sports governance. The polycentric node structure of the global

sports governance network provides behavioral carriers for the emergence of collective action dilemma; the absence of hierarchical authority and mandatory institutional constraints in network governance creates objective conditions for free-riding and responsibility evasion. In turn, collective ac-

tion dilemma further causes relational disconnection, power game imbalance and the collapse of collaborative efficiency, forming a cyclic logical relationship. The logical coupling relationship between the two theories is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Theoretical Coupling Logical Framework of Global Sports Governance Network and Collective Action Dilemma



3. Methodology

3.1 Subject Level: Free-Riding and Responsibility Evasion of Network Nodes

The global sports governance network involves a large number of stakeholders, including developed countries, developing countries, international sports organizations and commercial sports groups. Driven by self-interest, many network nodes are keen to enjoy public dividends from a stable global sports order but deliberately evade governance costs such as rule formulation, anti-doping investment and organizational operation. Developed countries have long monopolized the right of global sports rule-making and occupied dominant network positions, yet refuse to undertake corresponding global governance responsibilities. Some small and medium-sized countries rely passively on the governance achievements of major sports powers, leading to pervasive free-riding behavior. Such responsibility evasion at the actor level di-

rectly weakens the willingness of network collaboration and becomes the primary manifestation of collaborative failure.

3.2 Structure Level: Imbalanced Power and Fragmented Network Connection

Although global sports governance is defined as a polycentric network in theory, it has evolved into an obvious oligarchic dominated structure in practice, resulting in the alienation of network governance. The International Olympic Committee and Western developed sports powers occupy core dominant nodes, controlling rule-making, event allocation and benefit distribution rights. By contrast, developing countries and emerging sports organizations are marginalized with insufficient discourse power and weak participation in core governance affairs. Meanwhile, serious disconnection and communication barriers exist among network nodes. Interest conflicts between international sports organizations and national sports institutions are prominent; communication

and coordination mechanisms between commercial sports groups and public governance actors are inadequate. The fragmentation of network linkage makes it impossible to form cohesive collaborative forces and triggers structural collaborative failure.

3.3 Institutional Level: Deficient Rules and Missing Supervision Constraints

The global sports governance network lacks a unified mandatory institutional system and independent third-party supervision mechanism. Most governance rules depend on internal conventions of international sports organizations, lacking universal binding force and fair evaluation criteria. No clear benefit distribution mechanism and cost-sharing mechanism have been established among multiple actors. Irregular behaviors such as organizational corruption, commercial monopoly and political intervention cannot be effectively restricted and punished. The absence of institutional incentives and rigid supervision constraints makes it difficult to standardize the behav-

ioral choices of network nodes, further intensifying collective action dilemma and aggravating network collaboration failure.

3.4 Value Level: Divergent Concepts and Lack of Network Trust

Cultural differences, institutional distinctions and value divergence among network nodes lead to inconsistent cognitive orientations toward global sports governance. Western sports governance emphasizes commercialization and liberalization, while developing countries pay more attention to public welfare fairness and cultural inheritance. Such value divergence makes it difficult for network nodes to form consistent governance expectations, further reducing collaborative willingness and exacerbating free-riding motives. Long-term interest gaming and political frictions also result in insufficient mutual trust within the network. Stable cooperative expectations among actors are lacking, making it difficult to maintain long-term and stable collaborative governance relations. The multi-dimensional performance hierarchy of network collaboration failure is presented in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Multi-dimensional Hierarchical Structure of Network Collaboration Failure in Global Sports Governance



3.5 Classification of Network Collaboration Failure Types

According to the differences in formation causes and practical manifestations, network

collaboration failure in global sports governance can be divided into four categories. The specific classification and characteristics are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1. *Types, Manifestations and Typical Characteristics of
Network Collaboration Failure in Global Sports Governance*

Failure Type	Core Manifestation	Typical Characteristics	Root Cause
Interest Gaming Type	Nodes compete for rule-making power and benefit distribution, refuse to compromise	Self-interest priority, lack of overall awareness	Divergent interest demands
Free-riding Evasion Type	Enjoy governance dividends without bearing corresponding costs	Small and medium nodes follow passively	Public goods non-exclusivity
Structural Imbalance Type	Core nodes monopolize power, marginal nodes are excluded	Oligarchic network structure	Unbalanced global sports pattern
Institutional Defect Type	No unified rules, insufficient supervision and punishment	Low institutional binding force	Lack of top-level design

4. Formation Mechanism of Global Sports Governance Network Collaboration Failure Based on Collective Action Dilemma

4.1 Micro Subject Mechanism: Rational Choice of Self-Interest and Behavioral Preference Divergence

From the micro perspective of collective action dilemma, each node in the global sports governance network is a rational interest actor whose behavioral choice is based on cost-benefit calculation. Participating in global sports governance requires the input of time, capital, human resources and political resources, while governance achievements have the attribute of global public goods accessible to all nodes. Under the logic of rational self-interest, most nodes tend to choose free-riding rather than active participation in governance, directly inducing collective action dilemma. In addition, different governance actors hold distinct behavioral preferences: international sports organizations prioritize organizational autonomy and commercial profits; sovereign states focus on national sports interests and international status; sports industry groups pursue market profit maximization. The divergence of behavioral preferences makes it difficult to form unified collective action goals, laying a micro foundation for network collaboration failure.

4.2 Meso Network Mechanism: Node Scale Expansion and Relational Connection Barrier

Collective action dilemma theory holds that the more participants involved in collec-

tive affairs, the higher the cost of communication, negotiation and coordination, and the harder it is to reach consistent cooperation decisions. The global sports governance network covers almost all sovereign countries, dozens of international sports federations, and numerous sports social organizations and commercial groups, with huge node quantity and complex hierarchical relations. The expansion of network scale increases coordination costs and hinders unified action formulation. Meanwhile, geographical distance, cultural differences, institutional barriers and political contradictions create obvious relational connection barriers among nodes, leading to fragmented network relations and weak collaborative bonds, which further deteriorate the collective action dilemma.

4.3 Macro Institutional Mechanism: Absence of Incentive Constraints and Lack of Trust Mechanism

The lack of effective institutional incentive and constraint mechanism constitutes the macro institutional root of network collaboration failure. On the one hand, the global sports governance network has no scientific selective incentive system, and active governance actors cannot obtain corresponding institutional rewards, resulting in low participation enthusiasm. On the other hand, there is no rigid punishment mechanism for free-riding, responsibility evasion and irregular behaviors, and the low cost of opportunistic behavior indulges the spread of collective action dilemma. Moreover, long-

term interest gaming and political friction lead to the absence of universal trust mechanisms within the network. Without trust as an emotional bond, cooperative willingness among actors remains insufficient, collaborative relations are fragile, and interest games eventually lead to comprehensive network collaboration failure.

4.4 External Environmental Mechanism: Impact of Anti-Globalization and Political Power Intervention


The rise of anti-globalization and the intensification of great-power games provide external conditions for the deterioration of collective action dilemma. The resurgence of nationalism and unilateralism in some countries leads to deliberate decoupling from the global sports governance system and refusal to participate in multilateral collaborative governance. At the same time, political forces continue to intervene in sports affairs, taking sports rule formulation, event arrangement and anti-doping governance as tools of in-

ternational political games. This breaks the neutral and autonomous operational logic of global sports governance, disrupts the interest balance and cooperative order of the network, intensifies conflicts among governance actors, and makes collective action dilemma more prominent and network collaboration failure more serious.

5. China's Empowerment Strategy to Resolve Global Sports Governance Network Collaboration Failure

Guided by the vision of a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind and adhering to the principles of equal consultation, win-win cooperation and inclusive development, China can optimize network relations, improve institutional mechanisms and reshape value consensus to construct a multi-dimensional empowerment system. This systematic path helps break the collective action dilemma and resolve the deadlock of network collaboration failure.

Figure 3. *Multi-dimensional Empowerment Strategy Framework for Global Sports Governance*



Synergistic Evolution of China's Empowerment Strategies

As illustrated in Figure 3, China's empowerment strategy to resolve the global

sports governance network collaboration failure constitutes a multi-dimensional,

synergistic framework. The core objective of this framework is to break the collective action dilemma and reshape network collaboration. To achieve this, the strategy is anchored by the value concept of a “Community with a Shared Future for Mankind” (Section 5.5), which provides top-level spiritual guidance. Structurally, it relies on four interconnected pillars: rebuilding mutual trust and inclusive emotional bonds (Section 5.1), designing scientific selective incentives and cost-sharing mechanisms (Section 5.2), optimizing the polycentric pattern to balance power distribution (Section 5.3), and improving collaborative rules with an independent supervision system (Section 5.4). Rather than operating in isolation, these five dimensions form a closed-loop, synergistic evolution mechanism. Together, they address the root causes of network collaboration failure, ranging from rational self-interest to structural imbalance, thereby providing a comprehensive Chinese solution for a more equitable and sustainable global sports governance order.

5.1 Empowerment of Trust Relationship: Build a Mutual Trust and Inclusive Network Emotional Bond

Trust is the core foundation of network collaborative governance and the key to alleviating collective action dilemma. China adheres to the governance concept of harmony and inclusiveness, strengthens sports cultural exchanges and friendly interactions with developing countries, international sports organizations and regional sports groups to eliminate cognitive misunderstanding and cultural estrangement. It actively participates in multilateral sports cooperation platforms such as Belt and Road sports exchange projects, builds diversified communication and dialogue channels, smoothes information transmission among network nodes, reduces information asymmetry, and enhances mutual recognition and trust among governance actors. Meanwhile, China takes the lead in practicing the concept of responsibility sharing and benefit sharing, voluntarily undertaking global sports governance responsibilities, setting a benchmark to restrain free-riding behavior and guiding more stakeholders to participate in collaborative governance.

5.2 Empowerment of Incentive Mechanism: Design a Scientific Selective Incentive and Cost-Sharing System

A reasonable selective incentive system is an effective institutional tool to restrain free-riding and resolve collective action dilemma. China advocates the joint formulation of benefit distribution and cost-sharing rules for global sports governance, adheres to the matching principle of responsibility, right and interest, and ensures that actors who pay governance costs can obtain corresponding political, economic and social returns to mobilize cooperative enthusiasm. It promotes the establishment of a hierarchical incentive mechanism, granting more discourse power, event hosting qualifications and rule-making participation rights to developing countries with active participation, forming positive incentive guidance and reversing the passive free-riding mentality of marginal network nodes. Furthermore, China advocates constructing a fair evaluation system for global sports governance, taking governance contribution, responsibility bearing and collaborative willingness as core evaluation indicators, and linking evaluation results with resource allocation to form a closed-loop long-term incentive and constraint mechanism.

5.3 Empowerment of Network Structure: Optimize the Polycentric Pattern and Balance Network Power Distribution

A balanced network power structure is the structural guarantee to avoid collaborative failure. China unites developing countries and emerging sports forces to promote the reform of international sports organizations, break the oligarchic monopoly of Western powers in rule formulation, event allocation and organizational operation, and elevate the participation and discourse power of developing countries in core governance links to realize balanced network power development. It promotes the construction of a multi-level network collaborative governance system, gives full play to the bridging role of regional sports organizations, smoothes communication channels between core nodes and marginal nodes, breaks the fragmentation of network connection, and forms a collaborative pattern of multi-actor linkage and full-node participation. In addition, China adheres to

the principle of separating sports from politics, resists excessive political intervention in global sports affairs, maintains the neutrality and autonomy of network governance operation, and reduces interest game frictions caused by political factors.

5.4 Empowerment of Rule Supervision: Improve Collaborative Rules and Build an Independent Network Supervision System

Sound unified rules and independent third-party supervision form the institutional barrier to restrain opportunistic behavior. China takes the lead in advocating the joint formulation of universal basic norms for global sports governance, standardizing the behavioral boundaries of international sports organizations, sovereign states and commercial sports groups, and forming a rule system recognized by all network nodes. It promotes the establishment of independent third-party supervision and evaluation institutions to break the internal self-supervision limitation of international sports organizations, strengthen supervision over organizational corruption, doping violations, match-fixing and rule monopoly, and impose rigid punishment on irregular behaviors to raise the cost of opportunistic actions. China also advocates balancing the relationship between organizational autonomy and public governance, clarifying the autonomy boundary of international sports organizations, avoiding governance absence caused by excessive autonomy, and forming a governance pattern with standardized rules, effective supervision and orderly operation.

5.5 Empowerment of Value Concept: Lead Network Consensus with the Community with a Shared Future for Mankind

Value consensus serves as the spiritual guidance to integrate diverse interest demands and alleviate collective action dilemmas. China takes the vision of a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind as the core value guidance of global sports governance, advocates the concepts of equality, inclusiveness, cooperation and win-win, and breaks the zero-sum game mentality and hegemonic governance logic embedded in the traditional global sports governance network. It advocates that all countries and sports organizations share sports development achieve-

ments, jointly undertake governance responsibilities, collectively respond to global sports crises such as doping and commercial monopoly, and jointly build a fair, reasonable, inclusive and sustainable global sports governance order. The strategy guides all network nodes to transcend narrow self-interest, focus on global sports public interests and long-term development, and lay a solid value foundation for eliminating free-riding and realizing long-term stable network collaborative governance.

6. Conclusion and Research Prospects

6.1 Research Conclusion

Against the background of anti-globalization and international pattern restructuring, the global sports governance network composed of sovereign states, international sports organizations and global sports industry groups is deeply trapped in collective action dilemmas, presenting multi-dimensional network collaboration failure at the levels of actor responsibility, structural power, institutional rules and value cognition. The formation of collaborative failure is driven by four interrelated mechanisms: micro rational self-interest choice of network nodes, meso node scale expansion and relational connection barriers, macro absence of incentive and constraint institutions, and external impact of anti-globalization and political intervention.

Collective action dilemma constitutes the core root of network collaboration failure in global sports governance, while unreasonable polycentric power structure and deficient institutional rules act as important inducing conditions. Guided by the vision of a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind, China can effectively alleviate collective action dilemma and break the deadlock of network collaboration failure through five systematic empowerment paths: trust relationship empowerment, incentive mechanism empowerment, network structure empowerment, rule supervision empowerment and value concept empowerment. These paths promote the balanced reconstruction of the global sports governance network, realize the transformation from interest game to collaborative co-governance, and provide a feasible Chinese solution for the reform and optimization of the global sports governance system.

6.2 Research Limitations and Prospects

This study mainly adopts theoretical analysis and literature research methods to explore network collaboration failure and China's empowerment strategies in global sports governance, lacking empirical quantitative measurement of network node connection strength and collaborative efficiency. Future research can combine social network analysis methods, adopt empirical data to measure the structural characteristics and collaborative level of the global sports governance network, and further verify the formation mechanism of collaborative failure.

In addition, with the continuous evolution of international political and economic

patterns and the rapid development of digital sports technology, new problems and challenges will continue to emerge in the global sports governance network. Subsequent research can focus on the impact of digitalization and intelligent technology on network collaborative governance, explore new paths to resolve collective action dilemmas in the digital era, and further enrich and expand the research system of global sports network governance.

Declarations

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Conflict of interest: The authors report there are no competing interests to declare.

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