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*Uryumtsev Egor Romanovich,
Master's degree student,
Novosibirsk State University,
Novosibirsk, Russia*

UNDER THE BANNER OF ORIFLAMME: QUESTIONS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MILITARY STRUCTURE UNDER PHILIPPE II AUGUSTUS (1180–1223)

Abstract. the article deals with the organization of the military structure during the reign of Philippe II Augustus. The strengthening of the monarch's power and the bureaucratization of society are analyzed. The qualitative and quantitative composition of the royal army, sources of salary are being reconstructed. The symbolic aspect is investigated on the basis of a three-part model of the representation of society.

Keywords: Philippe II Augustus, military structure, Royal army, feudalism, High Middle Ages.

The reign of King Philippe II of France was marked by a long conflict in Western Europe. The confrontation with the Plantagenets went beyond the vassalage of the Capetians and spread to all lands: from Flanders to Guyenne. The lands of Normandy, Brittany, Aquitaine, and even the Holy Roman Empire became the arena of confrontation between the warring monarchs. The result of this struggle was the establishment of French domination on the continent and the transformation of the King of France into the most powerful ruler of Europe.

Philippe Augustus drew the right conclusions from the failures and defeats of the first years of his reign. Realizing that the main problem standing in the way of the formation of a strong royal power is feudal self-will, which could not be completely eradicated, Philippe decided to modernize other structures of the kingdom and put them at the service of the monarch directly. The main of these structures were the bureaucracy, namely the institutions of the Bailiff and Prévôt, and the royal army. The king began to solve the issues of officialdom even before his departure for the Third Crusade: in his l'Ordonnance-Testament of 1190 [3] Philippe regulated the rights and duties of the royal bailiffs and prévôts, and also transferred some of his

own powers to them. So, there were the prévôts, baillifs and communes (this included monasteries) in the royal lands that became subjects of feudal law: they administered the court, the army recruitment fell into their hands, and the report on the work done was sent directly to the king. Naturally, these changes caused discontent among the large feudal lords and lords of the kingdom, since before that it was their duties that included litigation, financial expenses and equipment of the troops. Now, in order to share the burden of these duties with the king, it was necessary to bring homage to the king. Thus, the Capetian monarchy became stronger, and all state structures came under the royal control. At the same time, Philippe II did not make revolutionary changes in the structure of society: being within the existing framework of feudalism, the king made maximum use of the prevailing historical reality to strengthen the royal power.

The second factor in strengthening the power of the king was the royal army. The army of Philippe II was fully the army of the High Middle Ages, which gave it a number of specific features. Firstly, it was a feudal army. It did not exist on a permanent basis, unlike, for example, the armies of Modern Times. The troops had to be assembled for a long time, and

the service life of such a feudal militia, according to French medievalists Philippe Contamine [2] and J.F. Fino [4], averaged 30–40 days. After the expiration of the term, the king had to come up with ways to “reward” those soldiers who decided to stay. Here we are talking about knight contingents, the service life of the infantry was three months, and after that a new set was needed. Hence the second factor follows – the army, consisting of a feudal militia, was not professional. Of course, there were military specialists in the army: knights, professional mercenaries, engineers, siege masters, etc. But collecting troops for a military campaign, the real share of professional military was very small. The professionalism of those people was also rarely determined by education. Since there were no specialized military institutions, usually knowledge about certain aspects of warfare was based on experience, one’s own or someone else’s. The third feature of the feudal army of that time was the lack of discipline and a small horizon of tactical planning. The management of the army was hampered by a shortage of qualified personnel. The real command exercised by the king on the battlefield could only indicate the direction of the first strike. Then the battle turned into a heavy melee of infantry and a series of duels of knights. At the described time, the main component of medieval battles was the massive spear strike of heavy cavalry. It was especially pronounced in France, where the number of knights exceeded the European average. However, this blow had its drawbacks. After the attack, the cavalry lost its momentum and got stuck in the infantry. An increasingly important criterion and indicator of experience is the ability to withstand the blow of the knight’s cavalry. To cover the infantry from cavalry attacks, a variety of protective measures were created: wolf pits, stakes dug into the ground, ditches. The number of shooters gradually increased: archers and crossbowmen. The number of defeats of knights in European history increased with the development of countermeasures. However, during the reign of Philippe Augustus, only other knights could be seriously opposed to the knights, and it was

the King of France who took up the increase in the number of heavy cavalries.

The study of the issues of the army is extremely revealing, since it represented the entire medieval society “in miniature”. The most important aspect is the number, as it characterizes the military and political capabilities of the king. Two synchronous sources have information about the army: “The list of Sergeants” (“Prisia servientum”, “Prisie de Sergens”) and “The General account of the King’s income for 1202” (“Compte général des revenus du roi de 1202”) [1, 33]. According to the General Account of the King’s Income for 1202, there were 257 knights in the royal army who brought homage to the king and were listed for the Ile-de-France domain. In addition, the feudal contingents that gathered in the event of war and made up about 800–1000 knights in 1214 [4]. If the gathering of sergeants was a relatively “simple” matter, then the situation with knights was always more difficult. The feudal principle was to help the king “by all means”, but in fact the vassals provided only a part of their troops for service. Thus, Guillaume le Breton described specific cases of numerical shortage of knights. For example, the Duke of Normandy could demand the “help” of 581 knights, but he provided only a third to the King of France. The Duchy of Brittany provided the king with only 40 out of the due 166 knights; the County of Ponthieu sent 14 knights instead of 60, etc. In addition, it was a difficult diplomatic task to achieve the arrival of even these limited contingents. Thus, such feudal service has always been accidental and short-lived. Besides to the knight contingents, the army of the French Kingdom had detachments of about 7.695 foot sergeants [2]; there were also 267 mounted sergeants, 86 mounted crossbowmen and 133 foot crossbowmen, 300 mercenary-routiers [2]. So, a new army structure was gradually formed in the service of the king, assembled under the control of the royal bureaucracy.

Where did the French Crown get the funds to maintain the army? Cities, abbeys and communes, were the main source of funds, royal tax collections.

Most of these lands were obliged to supply troops under feudal law – to bring the militia, but there were exceptions. Some large cities, such as Paris and Orleans, could use the so-called “right of redemption”. They supplied the king with a fixed amount of money corresponding to the value of their contingent. If Orleans had to supply 200 sergeants to the king for service, then using the “right of redemption” the city sent 600 livres to the royal treasury (at the rate of 3 livres per sergeant). Thus, only in 1202, 26.453 livres were received from the baillages of Orleans, d’Etampes, Paris and Senlis [1, 28]. This money was enough to pay for the service of an eight-thousand infantry army for three months. Naturally, not only these four bailli were the source of the crown’s funds. Sometimes feudal lords and knights could use the “right of redemption” (although more often they preferred military service to a monetary contribution). Money also appeared as a result of military operations, the capture of rich prisoners, etc.

But in addition to everyday and everyday aspects, it is necessary to understand that motivated people, moved their sense of duty. Like most medieval formations, the new structure began to acquire its own symbolism. The legend was formed within the framework of the Three-Part European model of the idea of society, and it found its complete form on the battlefield of Bouvines in 1214. The three-part model is a whole complex of ideas, a synthesis of Christian and social. Like the Triune God in heaven, the royal power on earth becomes triune. The King raised the Holy Oriflamme after

mass, he was blessed to fight and Saint Dionysius would fight for him. He was followed by his “three pillars”: noble chivalry, the right hand of the king; “good” commoners, sons of a submissive and loyal people, city communards and townspeople led by priests, not plebeians or mercenaries; the latter were people of prayer, “new chivalry”, consecrated by the cross. They were opposed by the excommunicated German barbarians, literally “the camp of evil and darkness”. The German Emperor Otto IV and his companions were enemies of the Pope and friends of heretics. And on the Lord’s Day Sunday, July 27, 1214, the evil and the damned fled, they were defeated by the power of a three-part, triune society gathered to fight in the name of God [5]. There, after the great victory, the unification of society took place, as if class differences disappeared and the people felt their closeness to the monarch. For the first time in the history of medieval France, the royal power, along with language and religions, became one of the pillars of the unity of the people.

On the field at Bouvines, the birth of the title of king of France took place, and Philippe, its bearer, received the nickname “Augustus” – the unifier, but also the conqueror who determined the fate of the Christian world. This combination of success and victories secured the duty of the arbiter of the fate of Europe for the King of France. Such a role generally corresponded to the political ambitions and new opportunities of the Capetian dynasty, and the next century in the history of Europe would be held under the banner of Oriflamme.

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