Section 5. Religious studies

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READING THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDONESIAN ISLAMIC TYPOLOGIES PERIOD OF 1960 TO 2021

Abstract. This article would explore the forty-one years of Indonesia's Islamic typologies (period of 1960–2020) which focused on the shift of Indonesian Islamic thought. This study wants to strengthen several theories in the field of history, Islamic thought and social-anthropology that religious understanding and its practice are always closely related to social change, especially on a global scale as shown by W. F. Wertheim (1956), Taufik Abdullah (1987), Chandra Muzaffar (1988) and Robert Hefner (1997). Until the 1960 s, Indonesian Islam was still in two major groups, traditionalists and modernists. However, from the late 1970 s to 2020, the typology of Indonesian Islam became very diverse went beyond traditionalism and modernism. Externally, the massive Islamization of Indonesia since the 1960s is also due to global networks: the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, West Asia, Southeast Asia and Western countries. Through this global influence, the initial categories of "traditionalists and modernists" (in 1970 s) are transformed into neo-modernists, post-traditionalists, liberal, transformative, cosmopolitan, neo-revivalists, salafi-Wahabists etc. In addition to using historical and sociological approaches, this study will also examine two theses: W. C. Smith thesis (1989) on "cumulative tradition" and "historical faith" describes that faith can be expressed historically. Various expressions of faith that have accumulated in history are then constituted into what is called "religious tradition"; and What is Islam? Shahab Ahmed (2016) stated that Islam as meaning-making for the self in terms of hermeneutical engagement with Revelation as Pre-Text, Text, and Con-Text.

Keywords: Indonesian Islam, Islamic thought, Social change, Global networks.

Introduction: A Reflection on the "Mystical Synthesis"and the Appearance of the Traditionalists versus Modernists

Merle Calvin Ricklefs (1943–2019), regarded by Peter Carey as the most prominent Javanese historian during the World War (Peter Carey 2021), discovered an interesting phenomenon during the Islamization on the Archipelago in the 17th century (or the 1600 s) known as the "mystic synthesis", which accepted Islam as a religion whilst maintaining the believe and practices of the Javanese mystical culture. Ricklefs even described Sultan Agung (1593–1645), considered as the greatest king during the post-Majapahit Java Island, as a devout Muslim who vowed to Islamize his kingdom, but still maintained his relationship with the supreme spiritual leader of Java, *Nyi Roro Kidul*. Through his

spiritual retreats, the Sultan was believed to obtain the secret mystical powers (Ricklefs [36, 5]) of both Java and Islam. After Sultan Agung, Raden Mas Said Pangeran Adipati Mangkunagara I (1726–1795) or the "Soul Catcher" (*Pangeran Samber Nyawa*), one of the most prominent kings of Java who founded the Praja Mangkunegaran, also lived the mystical synthesis life, even considered as the best example of it according to Ricklefs who stated that the prince was not only able to fulfill the syariah and read both the Qur'an and Arabic, but also "wrote the words of the Qur'an endlessly whilst his troops danced with the music of *gamelan*", as recorded in his diary in which he wrote the Arabic words of the Qur'an and translated them into Javanese (Ricklefs [38, 395]). In his palace, the prince conducted *khataman al-Qur'an* (finishing in reading the Quran) and joint prayers, while at the same time he enjoyed drinking Jenever (gin, a Dutch alchoholic drink), watching rooster fightings or other animal brawls, and believing the powers of the mighty spirits of Java (Ricklefs [38, 390]).

After Mangkunagara I, Prince Diponegoro (1785–1855), the noble son of Hamengkubuwono III and the political leader of the Javanese Muslims, also practiced the mystical synthesis. Peter Carey, an expert concerning Diponegoro, stated that Diponegoro had familiarized himself with the *santri* world and Islamic sermons during his childhood at the palace (Carey [18, 103]). When he moved to Tegalrejo during adolesence, the prince conversed with Muslim *kyais* and clerics (Carey [18, 104–5]). Even though he was a devout Muslim who conducted five daily prayers and fasting during the Ramadhan, Diponegoro also performed Javanese spiritual activities such as retreats in several magical caves and sacred graves in Java (Carey [18, 154–59]). For example, during one of his meditations in the Selarong Cave, he was spiritually visited by the Prophet and Walisongo (Nine-saints), who permitted him to commence the "Jawa War" (1825 to 1830) (Carey [19, 278–280; 286–87]), and was visited twice by Nyi Roro Kidul in his other mediations, although

he declined her offer of reinforcements (Carey [18, 168–170]). It is said that Diponegoro enjoyed drinking the wine with Europeans and even wore a golden necklace attached to a brooch and hooked into his turban (Carey [19, 42; 17, 46–7]). He also told stories of Muslim sacred figures to his brother, Hamengkubuwono IV (HB IV), in the form of *Serat Anbiya* and *Serat Menak*, while encouraging him to read *Arjuna Sasrabahu* and *Serat Bratayudha* that contained wisdoms of the Javanese culture (Ricklefs [36, 224]). This mystical synthesis behaviour was not only practiced by the kings, princes, or other nobles during that era, but also by every Muslim both from Java and outside of Java, as the teachings of Islam brought by the sufi merchants generally did not prohibit the spiritual traditions of the pre-Islamic society of the Archipelago.

The main characteristic of the mystical synthesis describes what is known as the "traditionalism of Islam" or the "traditional Islam", sometimes known as the "cultural Islam" through several modifications, which has the accomodative nature with various local cultures of the Archipelago. The Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) is always been the organization and community that treats and preserves the traditional Islam, ever since it was officially founded in 1926 and even before its formation. Najib Burhani (2016), points out that Ahmad Dahlan, as a Javanese, respected many Javanese traditions and cultures and it was his duty as the *Ketib Anom* of the Yogyakarta Palace to lead several ocassions such as *gerebeg Mulud* (to commemorate the birth of Prophet Muhammad), *gerebeg Besar* (during the Ied Qurban), *gerebeg Pasa* (at the final day of fasting), and *gerebeg Sultan* (to commemorate the Sultan's birthday) (Burhani [16, 87–88]). Since these occasions accomodated the phenomenons of both Islam and Java, it was indicated that the early era of the Muhammadiyah of Java was also a form of the "cultural Islam" (Haedar Nashir [29, 6–11]).

In the context of Wahabism in Sumatera, Azyumardi Azra [9] mentioned three figures: hajj Miskin, hajj Sumanik, and hajj Piobang. All three, who were

just returned from Mecca in 1803, along with Tuanku Nan Renceh became the figures of the Paderi movement that adopted the Wahabism. Azyumardi stated that during the Paderi War, a civil war amongst the people of Minangkabau, several mosques that symbolized heresy were attacked and burnt to the ground, in particular mosques belonged to Tuanku Nan Tuo and Jalaluddin, important figures of Naqsyabandiyah and Qadiriyah orders (Azyumardi [9, 147]). Meanwhile, according to Ricklefs [36], with the increasing number of middle class Javanese undertaking the hajj pilgramage, it also spread the belief of Wahabism in Java during the 19th century. The clash between the traditional group and the reformers created the very first two typologies in the history of Islam in Indonesia, modernists and tradisionalists. A scholar named Deliar Noer, according to Azyumardi, was responsible for distinguishing or dichotomizing the terms "traditional Islam" or "traditionalists" and "modernist Islam" through his now classic work, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900–1942* (1973), which categorized Muhammadiyah, Persis (Persatuan Islam), and other reformers as "modernist Islam", while NU and other similar organizations were regarded as "traditional Islam" (Azyumardi Azra [9, 18–19]). The reformers or the modernist Islam generally criticized, instead of "attacking", the beliefs and practices of the Muslim traditionalists that were often associated with superstitions, myths, heresy and *shirk*. There were other typologies mentioned by scholars besides Deliar, such as Clifford Geertz with his typology "conservative Islam versus modern one" or "syncretic versus puristic Islam" (Geertz [21, 148–153]), and Alfian, a researcher of LIPI (Indonesian Institute of Sciences) who coined three typologies during his research on Muhammadiyah in the colonialization era (1989): "traditionalist Islam, modernist Islam, and revivalist-fanatic Islam" (Alfian [4]).

"One Islam, Many Typologies"

Islam in Indonesia was generally categorized into two large groups until the end of the Old Order in 1960s, tradisionalists dan modernists, as confirmed by Abdullah Saeed, Professor of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Melbourne, that "until the late 1960s, Islamic thought in Indonesia was usually classified as either "modernist" or "traditionalist". Meanwhile, Nur Kholik Ridwan [39] coined those categories as the "rural-agrarian Islam" and the "urban-merchant Islam". Despite of this, Islam in Indonesia always moves dynamically, both internally, represented by Muslim traditions themselves, and externally, as the result of the developmentism projects during the New Order in 1970s. This external factor prompted the modernization process and the social change that affected the pattern of thoughts and practices of Muslims in Indonesia. Besides these two factors, there is also a global network that affects the Islamization in Indonesia, which includes the Middle East, the West and North of Africa, West Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Western countries (Europe, America, and Australia).

There are several studies that explain the internal and external factors, as well as the global network of the Indonesia's Islamization. Those references include Greg Barton in his book The Emergence of Neo-Modernism: A Progressive, Liberal Movement of Islamic Thought In Indonesia (1995), Fuad Jabali and Jamhari through *IAIN dan Modernisasi Islam di Indonesia* [25], Azyumardi Azra in his books *The Transmission of Islamic Reformism to Indonesia: Networks of Middle Eastern and Malay-Indonesian 'Ulama' in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (2004) and *Jaringan Global dan Lokal Islam Nusantara* (2002); Anthony Bubalo, Greg Fealy and Whit Mason on *Zaelous Democrats: Islamism and Democracy in Egypt, Indonesia and Turkey* (2008); Yon Machmudi on *Islamising Indonesia, The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)* (2008); Noorhadi Hasan on *Laskar Jihad, Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia* (2006); Imdadun Rahmat on *Arus Baru Islam Radikal, Transmisi Revivalisme Islam Timur Tengah Ke Indonesia* (2005); Greg Fealy and Anthony Bubalo on *Jejak Kafilah, Pengaruh Radikalisme Timur Tengah di Indonesia* (2007); and Abdurrahman Wahid at. all

on *The Illusion of an Islamic State* (2019). With both internal and external factors, along with the global networks, the typologies of theological, political, dan sosio-anthophological thoughts of Indonesian Islam have been diversed beyond the categories of traditionalists dan modernists.

Several scholars outside of Indonesia also create specific categories and typologies. A Dutch expert on Islam in Indonesia, Martin van Bruinessen (1995) mentioned four types of typologies: traditional Islam, reformist Islam, liberal Islam, and radical political Islam. Other typologies from his later work (2013), included reformist Islam, fundamentalist Islam, militant/radical Islam, and "Islam sempalan". In his study, Howard Federspiel [20] mentioned ideological Islam that was adopted by Persis (Persatuan Islam), as well as "nominal Muslim", "puritan Muslim", "traditionalist Muslim", and "modernist Muslim". MB. Hooker [24] also mentioned and criticized several typologies in reviewing *fatwas* from four Islamic organizations (Persis, Muhammadiyah, NU, and MUI (Indonesian Ulema Council), such as traditionalist Islam, modernist Islam, conservative Islam, fundamentalist Islam, liberal Islam, rational Islam, indigenous Islam, and practical Islam. Finally, Merle Calvin Ricklefs [37] mentioned four typologies such as traditionalist, modernist, Wahabi revivalist, dan Wahabi-da'wahist.

Numerous Indonesian Muslim scholars can be mentioned as representatives who explore various typologies. Fachry Ali and Bahtiar Effendi (1986) mentioned (1) traditionalism of Islam, (2) modernism of Islam, and (3) "New Thoughts" or neo-modernism with Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as the figures; democratic socialism with Adi Sasono, Dawam Rahardjo and Kuntowijoyo; internationalism or Islamic universalism with Amin Rais, Endang Saifudin Anshari, AM Saifuddin, and Imaduddin Abdurrachim; and modernism with Ahmad Syafi'i Maarif and Djohan Effendi. Alfian who studied Muhammadiyah in the colonial period (1989) mentioned (1) modernist Islam, (2) traditionalist Islam or

conservative traditionalist Muslims, and (3) puritan-revivalist-fanatics. M Syafi'i Anwar (1995) mentioned six typologies such as (1) formalistic, (2) substantivistic, (3) transformative, (4) totalistic, (5) idealistic, and (6) realistic. Budhy Munawar Rachman (1995), mentioned four typologies such as (1) Rational Islam by Harun Nasution and Djohan Effendi, (2) Civilized Islam by Nurcholish Madjid and Kuntowijoyo, (3) Transformative Islam by Adi Sasono and Dawam Rahardjo. Lastly, Moeslim Abdurrahman (1995) stated four typologies, (1) modernism, (2) universalism, (3) social Islam, and (4) transformative Islam.

Noorhaidi Hasan [22] mentioned eleven typologies (1) conservative Islam, (2) political Islam/Islamism, (3) reformist-modernist Islam, (4) traditionalist Islam/conservative traditional Muslims, (5) conservative Islamists, (6) Pure Islam, (7) Sururi and non-Sururi Salafis, (8) Contemporary Salafis, (9) International jihadist Salafis, (10) Transnational Salafis, (11) Yamani, Qutbi, and Khariji Salafis. Comparable typologies were mentioned by Haedar Nashir [29], such as (1) traditional Islam, (2) reformist/modernist Islam, (3) liberal Islam, (4) integral Islam/revivalist Islam, (5) modernist secular Islam, (6) Salafiyah Islam, (7) Salafism Islam, (8) Salafism of Haraki and Yamani, (9) revivalist Islam (gradualist, revolutionary, and messianic revivalist), (10) Neo-fundamentalist, (11) ideological Islam/political Islam/Islam Syari'ah/the Salafiyah ideology. Rumadi [41] has eight typologies: (1) traditionalist Islam, (2) modernist Islam, (3) Islamic post-traditionalism, (4) Islamic neo-modernism, (5) liberal Islam, (6) scripturalist/formalistic Islam, (7) ideological Islam, and (8) emancipatory Islam. Finally, Zuly Qodir who studied Indonesian Liberal Islam (2010) described four typologies of liberal Islam: (1) progressive liberals, (2) radical liberals, (3) moderate liberals, (4) transformative liberals.

Reading the Development of Typologies on NU and Muhammadiyah

Discussing the two largest Islamic institutions is important, as both are the public non-government or-

ganizations with the large amount of members, which represented as "modernists" dan "traditionalists" for decades. As there have been various typologies, these two basic typologies have now become irrelevant and, regardless of their images or categories, both NU and Muhammadiyah have large effects on developing the minds and attitudes of the Muslims in Indonesia. Even though there have been many other Islamic institutions or mass organizations, these two organizations still greatly affect the image of Islam in Indonesia.

Traditional Islam or the traditionalism of Islam has long had pejorative labels such as being dominated by old men who were "static", "backward" and "anti-progression". However, there have been many categories of religious thinking inside this traditionalist organization that are not always associated with the "traditionalist" thought. This is discussed in a thesis by Mujamil Qomar [33], which stated that many experts and researchers viewed that NU was not as stasis and old-fashioned as described by the modernists or against external figures and ideas. The appearance of Abdurrahman Wahid (well-known as Gus Dur), considered by Greg Barton as a neo-modernist figure, also encouraged other young and old figures of NU to have progressive and liberal thinkings outside the traditional circle or area of the *Nahdhiyyin* (NU's members). Quoted by Mujamil, Greg Fealy and Greg Barton explained that the NU traditionalists were proven to adapt qiuckly with changes and think creatively in countering the social changes and the political conditions (Mujamil [33, 26–7]).

Mujamil mentioned nine NU figures with progressive and liberal thought, categorized into five typologies: anticipative, eclectic, divergent, integralistic, and responsive. Muhammad Tolchah Hasan was an anticipative thinker, according to Mujamil, since he courageously presented both future challenges and their solutions at the same time. Masdar Farid Mas'udi and Ahmad Sahal Mahfudz were eclectic thinkers because Masdar chosed benefits as the primary consideration in establishing the law, while Sahal Mahfudz preferred conceptual buildings to

normative provisions. Abdurrahman Wahid or Gus Dur, Said Agiel Siradj, and Sjechul Hadi Permono were categorized as divergent thinkers because they liberated their thinkings and actions that other NU figures did not think of. Ali Yafie, an NU figure from South Sulawesi who was formerly known as *Rais Aam* (NU's supreme leader), was categorized as an integralistic thinker because he tended to harmonize issues confronted by other people. Meanwhile, Achmad Siddiq, a former *Rais Aam*, and Abdul Muchith Muzadi, a senior NU figure and the older brother of Hasyim Muzadi, were categorized as responsive thinkers for always being considerate in responding answers in order to ease the occured and ongoing people's unrests (Mujamil [33, 272–73]). In addition to these senior figures, many young NU figures, considered as liberals, would subsequently be active in the Liberal Islam Network (JIL), such as Ulil Abshar Abdalla and Abd Moqsith Ghazali. Other young people such as Rumadi and Ahmad Baso would actively involve themselves in the thinkings and movements of the Post-traditionalism (Rumadi [41]).

In the context of the scientific development and the preservation of the classical Islamic studies, Said Agiel Siradj stated in one occassion that the *Nahdhiyyin* who were considered traditionalists could read, study and master the classical books of Islam, considered as a priceless legacy of past Islamic civilization, before understanding and contextualizing them according to the requirements of Muslims today. The methods of the *Nahdhiyyin*, according to Said Agiel, was beyond modern. "Were they not great? Those who had mastered the classical books on Sufism, kalam studies, Islamic philosophies, Arabic grammars, fiqh, principles of fiqh, and others, and then combined them for the current context? Was it still relevant to call them traditionalists? Are there any modernists who could achieve what they did?" said Siradj defiantly (Siradj [38]).

However, the traditionalist, progressive, and liberal aspects within NU were not the only models of thought in the organization. In his latest research on

the middle class members of NU, Rubaidi [40], an academician at the UIN of Sunan Ampel of Surabaya, mentioned at least four typologies of thoughts within the NU: (1) conservative-Islamist, (2) moderatism, (3) progressivism, and (4) liberal (Rubaidi [40, 156]). According to Rubaidi, these typologies might simplify the empirical facts, but could describe the characteristics of the members of NU, especially from the middle class, and each typology could be similar or connected. He furthermore explained that if both progressivism and liberalism were dominant within the NU itself during 1960s, then there had been many conservative-Islamist and moderat figures inside the organization, in terms of thoughts and movements. For example, in 1968, NU and other Islamic institutions wanted the Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*) to be adopted and ratified by the Temporary People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia (MPRS) as part of the Outline of State Policy (GBHN), but this was rejected by both the Assembly and government. The support to revive of the Jakarta Charter, according to Rubaidi, resulted in NU being dubbed by some of the national mass media at that time as "Neo-Darul Islam". Since then, according to Said Agiel Siradj, the aspiration of an "Islamic state" within NU had lasted until at least 1971, where the campaign for Darul Islam were hardly mentioned anymore (Siradj [38]).

The attitudes of NU, or its several components, during 1960s and 1970s to support the Jakarta Charter, as well as the formalization of the Islamic laws and state, resurfarced during the reformation era of 1998. Several Islamic mass organizations such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the Indonesian Mujahideen Council (MMI), the Jihad Troops, the Institute for the Study and Application of Islamic Laws (LP2SI), political parties like The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and organizations like the Hizbut Tahrir of Indonesia (HTI) appeared in public with demands to reignite the Jakarta Charter, formalize the Islamic Laws through a Regional Regulation, and create a Khilafah Islamiah campaign system that would include

the middle class components of NU. The campaign for formalizing of the Islamic laws and state resulted in two large groups with two slogans, the first one only wanted to formalize the Islamic laws (*Perda Islam yes, negara Islam No!*), while the other campaigned for both Islamic laws and and an Islamic state (*Perda Islam yes, Negara Islam yes!*). Rubaidi stated that the first group represented a variant of middle class Muslims with "moderate or middle Islamism" images, while the other one portrayed the "right-wing" middle class Islamism (Rubaidi [40, 173]). He also stated that both large groups involved figures from NU, especially from the middle class, and the *Nahdhiyyin* along with other conservative-Islamist groups also showed intolerant attitudes and acts towards Ahmadis, Shi'ite, and other minority groups (Rubaidi [40, 178]).

Within the modernists branch like Muhammadiyah, there are several heterogeneous categorizations in religious thoughts and practices. During the long period of modernism and reformism, there were several times where Muhammadiyah became "static", and could be considered as "conservative" in its theological outlook, because the organization seemingly focused more on the theological purification with the slogan "returning to the Qur'an and Sunnah" in a literal, textual sense and a closed ideological landscape. A senior Muhammadiyah observer, Mitsuo Nakamura, stated that Muhammadiyah was less dynamic a few times than NU in terms of ideology. The NU, usually associated with old-fashioned people, now appears more progressive and reformist than Muhammadiyah, especially after Gus Dur became the leader of the organization (Nakamura [28, 81]). According to Ricklefs, both Nurcholish Madjid and Dawam Rahardjo stated that Muhammadiyah experienced a stagnation and was relatively outdated by the innovations of the traditionalists (Ricklefs [36, 362]), a situation where many Muhammadiyah observers and scholarly Indonesian Muslims criticized the organization for being "soft".

However, several educated and elite members of Muhammadiyah immediately realized the need

to strengthen reformism and progressive Islam, as became evident during the 43rd Muhammadiyah Congress in Banda Aceh in 1995. Apart from lecting Muhammad Amien Rais, a Doctor of Political Science from the University of Chicago and a Professor at Gajah Mada University, as the General Chairman, the congress also appointed a number of academics and professors at the University to lead Muhammadiyah at the central level. According to Najib Burhani, a number of religious reforms were also conducted during Amien Rais' leadership, such as reforming the Tarjih Council to the Council of Tarjih and the Development of Islamic Thought (MTPPI), led by Amin Abdullah, a Muhammadiyah intellectual and scholar, as well as the Professor of Islamic Philosophy at the UIN Sunan Kalijaga of Yogyakarta, from 1995 to 2000. During the leadership of Amin Abdullah, the Council published a rather controversial and liberal book entitled *The Thematic Interpretation of Al-Qur'an on the Social Relations Between Religious Believers* (Najib Burhani [15, 109]), which adopted the Hermeneutics philosophy in interpreting the messages and spirit of religious texts. For example, the book explained how a Muslim man was allowed to marry not only a Christian woman, but also women of Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism, etc., while a Muslim woman could marry a man of different religions, as long as his belief was not polytheism (*al-mushrikun*), as well as arguing that salvation in the afterlife could not only apply to Muslims, but also to other religions (Burhani [15, 112]). The congress in Banda Aceh also determined that Muhammadiyah decreed art as *mubah* or permissible, reforming the previous decree that art was unlawful (*haram*). As the result, photos or pictures of Kyai Ahmad Dahlan that were previously forbidden were allowed to be presented in Muhammadiyah-owned institutions. These examples showed how the organization embraced progressive ideas (Burhani [15, 109]). However, there was still a clash between during the Congress, described by Najib Burhani as "progressive versus conservative", "liberal versus

anti-liberal", "liberal versus moderat", and "liberal Islam versus Islam". The clash prompted him to create new neutral terms, "progressive Islam" and "pure Islam" (Burhani [15, 108]), which became dominant terms for elite members of Muhammadiyah.

Progressive changes and ideas greatly resonated during the 44th Muhammadiyah Congress in Jakarta, in 2000, which appointed Ahmad Syafi'i Ma'arif, a progressive scholar with a Ph.D in Islamic Thought from the University of Chicago, as the General Chairman. The congress also appointed a number of progressive national thinkers such as Amin Abdullah, Abdul Munir Mulkhan, and Dawam Rahardjo to the ranks of central leaders in Muhammadiyah. This development, according to Najib, could be the reason why Muhammadiyah experienced a great intellectual turmoil during the leadership of Buya Syafi'i, since progressive ideas dominated the movement and slowly became the main programs of the organization, including attempts to reform religious thoughts, such as reinterpreting theological attitudes regarding interfaith relationships, cultural da'wah, and efforts to indigenize Islam instead of commencing Islamization to local cultures (Burhani [15, 109–10]). The progressive modernism of Muhammadiyah was later redeveloped during the 47th Congress in Makassar by creating the term *"Islam Berkemajuan"*, as progress and advancement, according to Najib and Alfian, have been associated to the Muhammadiyah movement since the birth of the organization (Burhani [15, 38; Alfian [4, 164–65]). Najib also created other categorizations beside "progressive Islam" dan "pure Islam", such as Puritan, Salafist, and Progressive (Burhani [15]).

The existence of salafists and puritans in Muhammadiyah was discussed in a research by Hilali Basya (2020), a young Muhammadiyah figure and an academic at the University of Muhammadiyah in Jakarta, who stated that Muhammadiyah indeed inherited the salafi movement, but was not monolithic and had more diversed variants, in terms of teachings and movements. Din Syamsuddin, for

example, as quoted by Hilali, said that Ibn Taymiyah, Muhammad Abduh, Rasyid Rida, and Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab were salafi figures who inspired Muhammadiyah, even though with different measures (Hilali Basya 2020, 99). Haedar Nashir categorized Muhammadiyah as a reformist salafi and not a revivalist-puritan salafi, because, according to Hilali, Haedar stated that reformist salafis tried to modernize Islamic doctrines to be compatible with modernity and democracy. Haedar also wanted to distinguish Muhammadiyah from the salafi revivalist and radical movements, such as the Islamic Defenders Front (*Front Pembela Islam,* FPI), the Indonesian Mujahideen Council (MMI), and the Ahlusunnah Wal-Jamaah Communication Forum (*Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Waljamaah,* FKAWJ)

founded by Ja'far Umar Thalib (Hilali 2020, 100). Hilali concluded that several models of salafi streams could be found in Muhammadiyah, both reformists and revivalists (Hilali 2020, 100), in particular the revivalist-Islamist-conservative one. However, it was only a matter of perspective which one was dominant within the organization, as Najib Burhani stated that Wahabism as a part of the puritan revivalist salafi was never dominant in the organization (Burhani 2021). Ideas and movements of modernism-reformism, progressivism, and cosmopolitansim became the dominant parts of the organization, especially during the leaderships of M. Amien Rais, Syafi'i Ma'arif, Din Syamsuddin, and Haedar Nashir.

The various typologies of Islamic thoughts that have been categorized are shown in the table below:

TYPOLOGIES OF MODERN ISLAM IN INDONESIA: THEOLOGICAL, SOCIO-ANTHROPHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL IN THE PERIOD OF 1960−2021

Year	Writer	Typology	Category
1	2	3	4
1960	Clifford Geertz	Conservative vs Modern, Totalistic Religon vs Limited Religion, Syncretic Islam vs Pure Islam, Tradition and Scholasticism vs Pragmatism and Radicalism.	Theological-Anthropological
1995	Martin van Bruinessen	Traditional Islam, Reformist Islam, Liberal Islam, Radical Political Islam.	Theological-Political
1999	Greg Barton	Traditionalist, Modernist, Neo-Modernist.	Theological
2001	Howard M. Federspiel	Ideological Islam, Nominal Muslim, Puritan Muslim, Traditional Muslim, Modernist Muslim.	Theological
2002	MB. Hooker	Traditional Islam, Modernist, Conservative, Liberal, Fundamentalist, Indigenous Islam,	Theological-Sociological

1	2	3	4
		Practical Islam, Rational Islam.	
2012	M.C. Ricklef	Modernist Traditionalist Wahabi-Revivalist Wahabi-Da'wahist	Theological
2013	Martin van Bruinessen	Reformist Islam, Fundamentalist Islam, Militant Islam, Radical Islam, Fragmented Islam (Islam Sempalan).	Theological-Political
1963	Deliar Noer	Traditionalist, Modernist.	Theological-Political
1986	Fachry Ali dan Bahtiar Effendi	Traditionalism of Islam, Modernism of Islam, New Thoughts (Neo-Modernism, Democratic Socialism), Internationalism/Universalism of the Modernism of Islam.	Theological-Sociological
1989	Alfian	Traditionalist Islam, Modernist Islam, Conservative Traditionalist Muslims, Puritan-Revivalist-Fanatic Muslims	Theological
1995	Harun Nasution	Traditionalist, Modernist, Rational Islam.	Theological
1995	M. Syafi'i Anwar	Formalistic, Substantivistic, Transformative, Totalistic, Idealistic, Realistic.	Theological-Political
1995	Budhy Munawar Rachman	Rational Islam of Harun Nasution and Djohan Effendi, Civilized Islam of Nurcholish Madjid and Kuntowijoyo, Transformative Islam of Adi Sasono and Dawam Rahardjo	Theological-Sociological

1	2	3	4
1995	Moeslim Abdur-rahman	Modernism of Islam, Universalism of Islam, Social Islam, Transformative Islam.	Theological and Socio-Anthropological
2001	Nurkholik Ridwan	Bourgeois Islam (Urban-Merchant), Modernist Islam, Proletarain Islam (Rural-Agrarian), Tradisionalist Islam.	Theological and Socio-Anthropological
2002	Mujamil Qomar	Anticipative NU, Ecletic NU, Divergent NU, Integralistic NU, Responsive NU.	Theological, Sociological, and Political
2006	Noorhaidi Hasan	Conservative Islam, Political Islam/Islamism, Reformist-Modernist Islam, Traditionalist Islam/Traditional Conservative Muslim, Islamist-Conservative, Pure Islam, Sururi and Non-Sururi Salafi, Contemporary Salafi, International Jihadi Salafi, Transnational Salafi, Salafi of Yamani, Quthbi, and Kariji.	Theological-Political
2007	Haedar Nashir	Traditional Islam, Reformist/Modernist Islam, Liberal Islam, Integral/Revivalist Islam, Secular Modernist Islam, Salafiyah of Islam, Salafism of Islam, Salafiyah of Haraki and Yamani, Revivalist Islam (Gradualist Revivalist, Neo-Fundamentalist, Revolutionary Revivalist, Messianic Revivalist), Ideological Islam/Political Islam/ Syari'ah Islam /Ideological Salafiyah.	Theological-Political
2008	Rumadi	Traditionalist Islam, Modernist Islam, Post-Traditionalism Islam,	Theological-Sociological-Political

1	2	3	4
		Neo-Modernism Islam, Liberal Islam, Scriptualist/Formalistic Islam, Ideological Islam, Emancipatory Islam.	
2010	Zuly Qodir	Progressive Liberal Islam, Radical Liberal Islam, Moderate Liberal Islam, Transformative Liberal Islam.	Theological-Sociological
2014	Najib Burhani	Progressive Muhammadiyah, Pure Muhammadiyah.	Theological-Sociological
2016	Najib Burhani	Javanese /Cultural Muhammadiyah, Purificative/ Syari'ah Oriented Muhammadiyah.	Theological and Socio-Anthropological
2016	Najib Burhani	Puritan Muhammadiyah, Salafist Muhammadiyah, Progressive Muhammadiyah.	Theological-Sociological
2020	M. Hilali Basya	Santri Aristocate Muhammadiyah, Secular Aristocate Muhammadiyah, Merchant Muhammadiyah, Reformist Salafi Muhammadiyah, Revivalist /Conservative Salafi Muhammadiyah, Progressive Muhammadiyah.	Theological-Sociological-Political
2021	Rubaidi	Conservative-Islamist NU, Moderate NU, Progressive NU, Liberal NU.	Theological-Political

Based on the categorizations and typologies above, an "image", whether negative or positive, appears with all the consequences that accompany it: political, theological and sociological, which could either portray the real image or even a misleading one. For Islamic preachers, for example, certain Islam typologies are usually considered as "demeaning" or "insulting", such as when a preacher mentions "liberal Islam", he will usually consider it as a form of deviant Islam, while the Islam that he himself embraces is considered as "true Islam". On the other hand, the terms "Islamic fundamentalist" or "radical Islam", or "conservative Islamist" used by Muslim academics or Western observers also have a "negative" tone and even offended several Islamic groups. This situation raises a few questions: are the various typologies and categorizations of "Islam" or "Indonesian Islam" really accurate and informative, or unclear and distorting instead? Furthermore, is typology still needed for academic purposes?

Upon closer examination, it can be concluded that several typologies and labels are no longer considered appropriate and and hence, irrelevant. Image, label, and typology are three things that show the

context of space-time and the spirit (*Zeitgeist*) of a certain period and the intellectual models that were developed during the making of the typologies and labels. For example, recently the label of NU solely as a traditionalist-conservative and Muhammadiyah as a modernist-reformist, in terms of the 1960s and 1970s, is no longer relevant. Another example is MB Hooker's research on Islamic fatwas produced by NU, Muhammadiyah, Persis and MUI from the 1950s to the 1990s, concluding the irrelevance and inaccuracy of several typologies such as "traditionalist", "modernist", "conservative" and "fundamentalist", because the complexities of religious thoughts between the four institutions cannot be categorized into one "narrow box" (Hooker [24, 116 and 308]). The traditionalist NU could produce some fatwas considered as modern, while modernist institutions like Muhammadiyah or Persis have several fatwas that are literalistic and conservative. To answer the questions "are the typologies and labels still relevant?" or "is it still required?", in academic terms, the typologies are required to understand Indonesian Islam with comprehensible classifications and arguments, especially for the scholars who coined the typologies, even though not everyone could accept them. It is important to carefully consider that avoiding pejorative and demeaning labelings is important in order to determine new and more neutral and acceptable terms. The typologies and labels must also be accompanied by strict classifications and objective references, instead of subjective ones. For example, the word of "religious fundamentals" in term of "ushul al-din", which later became the term of "Islamic fundamentalism" at first objectively referred to 'a theological sense' before being categorized a "political" typology and creating stereotypes and so on, must be explained in an academic-objective way.

Several Causal Factors

There are several factors that cause the formation of various typologies. *First* and *foremost* are the responses or reactions on cultural and sociological contexts, such as social changes and reactions to several thoughts and ideologies, which include Western thoughts, secularism, communism, chauvinistic nationalism, global injustice, etc (Deliar Noer [30, 88]). The emergence of modernist-reformists, both in the Islamic world and Islam in Indonesia, is also in response to the static, old-fashioned, and fatalistic Muslims. Whether it is considered as intellectualistic-systematic-strategic or just pragmatic-tactical, this emergence shows the 'flexibility' of religion, in the form of religious interpretations, either conservative or progressive, to continually exist in the changing world. "Existence" becomes an important keyword for the sustainability of a religion through new, fresh and relevant "religious interpretations". In the history of religions, the ancient religions of the Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, or even Indonesians have no longer existed and left only historical records. One main factor on why this happened is because they did not start any "religious reforms" or "re-interpretations" of the religions that caused them to become irrelevant or unable to meet the moral, spiritual, material and intellectual requirements at that time. These religions were then abandoned by the descendants of their ancestral followers and mankind in general.

Secondly, which is still connected with the first factor, is that Semitic religions such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam aggresively wanted to "create a history" upon this world. Mircea Eliade, a Romanian scholar and Profesor of Religious Studies, University of Chicago, reviewed that Semitic religions had the fundamental distinction with archaic religions in modern terms. For Eliade, according to the archaic people, life had no specific purposes and meanings, as they wanted something meaningful, eternal, beautiful and perfect. They were accustomed with bitterness and hardships of life, such as natural disasters, epidemics, etc., however they were unable to understand why all human adventures in this life had to end in death and treated it as an incomprehensible and unwanted mystery (Daniel L. Pals [31, 214]). Eliade then described the feeling that plagued these

primitive people as the "historical terror", which later encouraged them to believe on myths and rituals, especially regarding the return to immortality.

Eliade furtherly explained how the mysteries and feelings prompted those archaic people to "return home" or become unity with the Sacred One in a moment called *illo tempore* ("at the moment") or *"kun fayakun"* in Islamic term, where the universe gained its form. They wanted to exclude themselves from and had no interest to create "history", because they had only the desire to enter the "nostalgia of paradise" with the Sacred One (Pals [31, 213–14]). This trait discouraged the archaic society from conquering and exploiting the nature and the place where they lived, as well as from conducting an endless expansion as the modern people did. On the other hand, the Jewish religion brought by Abraham, Moses, David, and Solomon was considered as a historical religion centered around the personal God that "could be found in historical moments" and provided this life with meanings and purposes. This tradition, later adapted by Christianity and Islam, conceived the idea that nature and life were not originated from the personal Sacred God of Israel that ruled the universe, but rather a "historical God" that provided important roles in history by involving His powers into certain historical events, such as conquests, wars, religious preaching, and so on (Pals [31, 216]). Therefore, the God of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, as the "God of history", ordered His worshippers to manage the Earth and continuously "creating history", by encouraging more contextually relevant and religious changes.

The third factor is an internal one, examplified by the NU's members who read the classical books such as tafsir, Islamic laws (fiqh), Sufism, etc. and connected them with the conditions of this world. The other example involved members of Muhammadiyah, Persis (Persatuan Islam), and other academics from State Islamic Univesities (UIN) and State Islamic Institutions (IAIN), who read and interpreted the teachings of the Qur'an, Hadits, Sunnah, and Islamic knowledge, then connected with the reality, the surroundings, and the world in general. Whether they were conservatives or progressives, the readings and interpretations of their internal intellectual knowledge also produced several models of the theological-anthropological understanding.

The fourth factor involves the modernization and tranformation of Islamic studies in the State Islamic Institution (IAIN). According to Harun Nasution, the IAIN suffered a crisis until the mid 1970s just like other traditional Muslims, which included (1) closed-mindedness, especially from the lecturers and leaders, and (2) the syari'ah-oriented curriculum. Harun futherly explained that students and lecturers only received syari'ah materials that only discussed faith, the history of Islamic civilization, philosophies, etc., and all Islamic problems were only solved through the studies of fiqh (Uchrowi and Thaha, 42). Nurcholish Madjid also admitted that, during his study in Ciputat, the IAIN was viewed as a marginalized institution in terms of intellectual participation discourses (Jabali and Jamhari [25, 139]), while Ihsan Ali Fauzi commented how most of the students at the time were rural Muslims who considered the IAIN as their only option, or *"the best offer they can get"* as he quoted (Jabali and Jamhari [25, 139]). This situation later encouraged Mukti Ali, Nurcholish Madjid, and Harun Nasution to be the first generation to modernize the IAIN.

When he was the Rector of IAIN Jakarta (1972–1982), Harun suggested a newly progressive and liberal curriculum to the Department of Religious Affairs, as well as proposing new materials during a meeting with other Chancellors of IAIN in Bandung (1973), such as Philosophy, Studies of Sufism, Kalam, Sociology, the History of Islamic Civilizations, etc (Uchrowi and Thaha, 41). The materials were later published as a monumental book to this day, entitled *Islam Ditinjau dari Berbagai Aspeknya* (Islam Seen from Various Aspects) (Volumes 1 and 2) in 1977. In order to broaden the horizons for both lecturers and students, Harun also wrote a series of textbooks such as Islamic

Theology (1977), Philosophy of Religions (1973), Philosophy and Mysticism in Islam (1978), Modern Schools in Islam (1980), etc., establishing the IAIN campus in Jakarta as a pionering place for reformers (Uchrowi and Thaha, 44).

During the next development, the Islamic studies of the IAIN were required to provided more critical and contextual discourses, as well as a scientific analysis on traditional Islamic studies by the past Muslim society in every possible aspect. These modern auxiliary studies could enrich analytical perspectives on Islamic knowledge such as philosophy, sociology, anthropology, history, and introduction to science as important aspects of the curriculum for IAIN. With these various approaches to modern science, the students, who were generally traditionalists and modernists at the beginning, were encouraged to study Islam academically with modern methodologies. During the second generation, some figures of IAIN such as Fachry Ali, Dawam Rahadjo, Komaruddin Hidayat, Azyumardi Azra, Malik Fajar, M. Atho Mudzhar, Din Syamsuddin, Amin Abdullah, Bahtiar Effendi, and others developed Islamic studies that combined philosophies and modern social studies, later desribed as the "liberal Islam" model by Azyumardi Azra, the Rector of IAIN (1998–2006) (Jabali and Jamhari [25, 116]).

The fifth factor that affects various typologies is the intensity of Indonesian Muslims to connect with the world and the existence of socio-political changes, both nationally and globally. During the late 19th until the mid 20th centuries, there were two categories associated with Indonesian Muslims, traditionalists and modernists, along with other terms such as "indigenous Islam" or "local Indonesian Muslim" by Hooker [24, 31]. There have been various emerging typologies after Indonesian Muslims were connected with other Muslim worlds or the wider Western world. For example, the groups of "political Islam" or "scripturalist Islam" or "revivalist-puritans" and other variants were emerged after communicating with "political Islam" groups from the Middle East, Central Asia, and North

Africa since 1960 s, while the "progressive Islam" or "substantial Islam" or "liberal Islam" groups and its variants were the results of conversing with the group of "renewal of Islamic thoughts" in Egypt and other countries. Besides modernizing the IAIN, the Indonesian Muslim academics from the many branches of the Institution also gained scholarships to continue their studies at universities in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, India, and in Western countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia and Western Europe since the era of Minister of Religious Affairs, Munawir Syadzali (1983–1993) (Wahyuni Nafis [27, 86–87]), later continued when Tarmizi Taher assumed the office from 1993 to 1998. As for scholarships for lecturers of IAIN which required wider contacts from around the world, Munawir Syadzali was able to convince the Indonesian government of the important role of the Institution in developing the Islamic intellectualism amongst the Indonesian Muslims (Jabali and jamhari [25, 151–52]). Therefore, by the time they returned to Indonesia, the academics who were generally affiliated with NU, Muhammadiyah, and HMI (Muslim Student's Association), would discuss issues such as "contemporary Islamic studies", "modern Islamic methodologies" as well as a progressive and contextual Islamic insights from their studies in abroad.

The emergence of various typologies of Indonesian Islam due to the five main factors above strengthens the classical hypotheses of historians, sociologists and anthropologists on the dialectic of religion and social change. The historian Wertheim (1959) for example, noted the Islamic faith invaded the archipelago via the trade routes which were then welcomed by coastal communities in large port cities. This is what is then referred to as an "urban Islam". In turn, Islam continued to be embraced by people in countryside and hinterland which gave rise to the "rural Islamic" model. During the early centuries, said Wertheim, Islam had a psychological and social influence on the population. The influence was great. In Wertheim's word, "the Islamic faith had in many respects a revolutionizing and modernizing

effect on Indonesian society" (Wertheim 1959, 175–76). However, along with social and global changes, Indonesian Islam must reform, so among the educated Muslim elite, religious traditional understandings was abandoned. They then embraced "modern Islam" or "rational Islam". But tensions between traditionalists, modernists, and revivalists persist along with social and global changes.

Chandra Muzaffar [26], a Malaysian intellectual, proposed the term "Islamic resurgence", instead of Islamic re-assertion and Islamic revivalism. According to Muzaffar, one of the arguments of Islamic resurgence in Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia and Malaysia, is that there are global threats and changes that have implications for Muslims. According to Muzaffar, the main causes of the revival were first, the response, or more precisely, the disenchantment of Muslims against secular Western civilization which ignored moral and human values. Second, in response to the effects of developments, both in the West and in the East. Third, the failure of the social system that relies on capitalism and socialism. Fourth, the lifestyle of the secular elite in Islamic countries. Fifth, the desire for power among the growing middle class. Sixth, urban lifestyle. Seventh, the confidence of Muslims because of Egypt's victory over Israel in 1973 and the Iranian revolution in 1979. Through these struggles, Muslims not only re-dialogue Islam's position between capitalism and socialism, but also that Muslims contribute deeply to a search for an alternative values and meanings (Muzaffar [26, 32 & 43]). It is in this resurgence context that there is a dialectic between urban and traditionalist Muslims in articulating their Islam.

In line with Muzaffar, Robert Hefner [26], an American anthropologist, said that "Islam in Southeast Asia can no longer be overlooked because since the late 1970s this region has experienced an unprecedented religious resurgence" (Hefner [26, 5]). By citing several references, Hefner said that there have been many influences on this religious resurgence. First, Internationally, such developments as the Ira-

nian revolution, the growth of Middle Eastern economic power since the 1970s, and the recent disenchantment in much of the Muslim world with secular nationalism have all played a role (Hefner [26, 5]). Second, in response to Western modernism. From the struggle of these factors, presumably a "new Islamic model", or in Hefner's phrase "new Muslim intellectuals", will emerge that replaces the classical traditional Islamic model. In my opinion, the new Islamic model can take many forms: neo-revivalist, neo-modernist, post-traditional and others. In short, what Hefner meant by "new Muslim intellectuals" may well have gone beyond the traditionalist and modernist categorizations that were popular in the previous decades.

The prominent Indonesian historian, Taufik Abdullah [1] clearly confirmed Islam as a foreign religion that came to the archipelago. As a religion, Islam has not merely theological and spiritual aspects but also historical, social and cultural ones. As a "foreign religion" the early Muslim preachers understand very well that the people who are the address of Islamization already have cultural and traditional customs. They realize that preaching by force will not be accepted by society. In this process, according to Abdullah, Islam must not only "to tame" its audience (its targets), but it must also to be humble itself (Abdullah [1, 3]). In order to avoid conflicts with local culture and customs, Islam must be creative in creating symbols that they can easily accept them. In other words, although Islam is still bound by its eternal and universal revelation, the process of acculturating Islam or "understanding Islam" with culture and social changes is inevitable (Abdullah [1, 3]). Historically and socially, Islam must continuously reform itself, or reform its interpretations according to the times.

My study on typologies of Indonesian Islam for the period 1960–2020, or that "one Islam, many typologies", in one perspective can be read as a study that strengthens the thesis of the above scholars that social and global changes have had an effect on the emergence of various religious interpretations. However, what should not be ignored is that whether religion

affects social change or vice versa, in more specific details requires further research. There are many limitless factors. It is for this reason that the warnings of the prominent Southeast Asian historian Anthony Reid (2004) are relevant. He reminded scholars to be careful of an explanation that simplifies the problem: that changes in religious patterns are merely a consequence or rationalization of economic change. The safest view, according to Reid, is one must understand that social (and religious, sic.) changes is actually "reinforcing one another" and "a mixture of almost limitless factors" (Reid [35, 30–31]).

Confirming Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Shahab Ahmed's Theses

Academically, this article confirms, or lets say strengthens, two theses formulated by W. C. Smith (1964, 1989) and Shahab Ahmed (2016). Through his two major works, *The Meaning and End of Religion* (1964) and *Towards A World Theology* (1989), Smith submitted theses on "cumulative tradition" and "historical faith" to describe the relationship between 'humans' and 'superhuman' or the sacred and the profane in religious life, in any religious tradition. Cumulative traditions are traditions that evolve or that continue to grow up. It can also be understood as a tradition that changes according to the context of the actors. Smith calls it a tradition that is "dynamic, diverse, and observable." Smith's thesis on cumulative tradition is closely related to his other thesis, historical faith. For Smith, faith can be expressed historically. Various expressions of faith that have accumulated in history are then constituted into what is called "religious tradition". It is clear for Smith, that men's faith finds expressions in many forms. The keyword for understanding what are actually "cumulative tradition" and "historical faith" is that "religious life means participating in the process." Again, "participation" and "process".

Smith found his thesis based on his experience of traveling to several Muslim countries and exchanges with engaged Muslim friends for almost 25 years. He began with the usual notion that Islam was the name of a religion, the religion that the Muslims have. Gradually he discovered that it is subtler than that: more fluid, more infinite, more dialectical, more personalist, more faith-like. With a long history and many schools of thought, Muslims emerged in a very rich and complex world and traditions that were not regarded as just "black and white". With all the complexities of Muslim understanding of classical and modern Islam and their responses and as well as their religious practices, if Smith answered the question of what Islam is as follows: "Islam is in process of becoming, on its mundane and human side". Understanding Muslims, said Smith, must understand their relationship with God, with the Transcendent, but also have to see their particular and contextual historical struggle. This is what Smith calls "historical faith". In other words, becoming a Muslim today means participating in the context of the 21ˢᵗ century, with the reality of having to accept the past history of Islam, and be ready to openly welcome all challenges and possibilities of new models, faces and traditions of Islam. This is "the cumulative tradition". In summary, Smith's thesis on "cumulative tradition" and "participation process" as he states that: to be a Christian means to participate in the Christian process, just as to be a Muslim means to participate in the Islamic process; to be a Jew, in the Jewish; and so on, and on.

The scholar who continued Smith's thesis with more sophisticated exploration was Shahab Ahmed thorough *What is Islam* (2016), regarding "Islam" and "Islamic". *First*, Islam combined the terms "normative Islam" and "Practised Islam" or "historical Islam". *Second,* the term "Islam" in a conceptual term was a hermeneutical engagement with Pre-Text, Text, and Con-Text of Revelation to Muhammad (Ahmed [3, 346–47]), or a "meaning-making process" that involved the Muslims in an engagement towards the revelation by the Prophet. Ahmed stated that the Text and Pre-Text are parts of Con-Text since it is only in the received terms and vocabulary of Con-Text that their meanings will reach and operate in a Muslim or the Muslim society (Ahmed [3, 358]). Text and Pre-

Text are simply not available for hermeneutical engagement without Con-Text, as it constantly informs those two aspects. For example, a Muslim who lives in Con-Text means that he or she lives in the complex of meanings that is elaborated by the previous hermeneutical engagement with the Revelation. The Con-Text itself becomes a source of Revelation along with Pre-Text and Text, becoming the Con-Text of Revelation. Con-Text, Text, and Pre-Text are inseparably combined together to form the Revelatory matrix of Islam, becoming the Pre-Text, Text, and Con-Text of the Revelation (Ahmed [3, 359]). *Third,* such formulation could categorize the practices by Muslims throughout the Islamic world as "*Islams* not-Islam" (Ahmed [3, 542]). On the one hand, the plurality of "*Islams*" showed that since the first generation of Muslims, Islam has always appeared in many faces and interpretations through many schools about Islam, both in theology and Islamic law. The adages such as "One Islam, many schools of thought", "one Islam with various interpretations", or "one Islam with many sects" is a fact that was undeniable and difficult to "unite" into "one Islamic school". But on the other hand, the concept of plurality for "*Islams*", according to Ahmed, proved that the diversity of Islamic expressions was not constitutive, but could be conceptualized as 'Islam itself'. Therefore, according to Shahab Ahmed's thesis, there should be no judgment that a certain sect in Islam has been deviated or was considered as un-Islamic, instead to treat all different practices and expressions of Islam in Muslim countries as 'authentic and Islamic'. In other words, It is impossible for one Islamic group to claim to be the most Islamic or the truest Islam, while another group is un-Islamic and inauthentic. The historical and sociological facts about Indonesian Islam (Southeast Asian Islam), Turkish Islam, Moroccan Islam, Egyptian Islam, Saudi Arabian Islam are as Islamic as Muslims in China or Muslims in Western countries. They are all authentic Muslims.

Accordingly, all categorization and typologies above express interpretations and expressions on "Islam", which are Islamic and authentic because all the interpretations and formulations in such various typologies are still in the sense of hermeneutical engagement with the revelations received by the Prophet Muhammad and as a product of the Pre-Text, Text, and Con-Text.

Conclusion

The intensity of Indonesian Muslims to greet and interact globally and transnationally would possibly encourage the emergence of many variants and typologies of theological and socio-anthropological thoughts. The frequent social and political changes, both nationally and internationally, would inevitably trigger the typological shifts. For this reason, the sociologists of religion treated religions as a 'social fact' related to social developments and changes (Taufik Abdullah [1, 12]). The social dynamics and changes could also shift the typologies and categorizations depending on the adaptation, response, and reaction of the religious adherents. For example, groups that were previously considered as "modernist and advanced" could be changed into "defensive and conservative", while other groups that were considered as "conservative and closed-minded" could transform into "progressive and liberal" ones. In the future, instead of being stasis, there will always be changes and shifts in the typologies of the theological and socio-anthropological understanding.

The complexity of "humans as a whole" should discourage a Muslim to embrace one strict and rigid typology, since a "traditionalist Muslim" in religion could actually become a modernist in secular and some religious matters, making it impossible for that person to be a complete traditionalist. On the other hand, a "modernist Muslim" is actually a "traditionalist" if he or she would follow various Islamic traditions from the Qur'an and the Sunnah taught by the Prophet, while respecting several Indonesian traditions and customs. It is true that the human complexity in terms of physical, physiological, mental and spiritual matters could not really be categorized into one academic typology, because creating such "divisions" would diminish complicated and complex human beings

into one or several dominant tendencies. But, again, as Clifford Geertz points out, categorization is only a description of tendencies (Geertz [21, 161]).

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