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THE PROBLEM OF VALUES IN THE POSTNONCLASSICAL SCIENCE

Abstract

Goal: To identify the aspects and features of the influence of values on the cognition process in postnonclassical science.

Methods: Comparison, generalization, system analysis, theoretical learning, as well as the method of analogy.

Results: Based on the analysis of the selected literature (books, periodicals, etc.) the historical prerequisites of the postnonclassical science, its outstanding characteristics and features, in particular the so-termed new type of philosophizing, emphasizing the moments of particularity, freedom and asserting the independence of personal being and the world of values; and also the place of values in the postnonclassical world picture of the Russian and foreign authors has been determined, and also the relationship of values with the principle of subject-object dichotomy, which lies in the fact that each partner has no common features with another one (Hume's Guillotine).

Scientific novelty: The paper is the first attempt to apply an interdisciplinary approach (humanitarian and naturalistic) to the analysis of the problem in studying the mechanisms of inclusion of values in cognition.

Practical relevance: Practical relevance: the results obtained during the study can be used in solving such problems as the formation of an important worldview aspect – the value aspect of consciousness, axiological dominant based on foreign and domestic traditions in the substantiation of the value approach of formation of personality in various areas of economic, political, managerial activity, the public consciousness orientation to universal human values, as well as organizing a wide range of scientific and practical activities (further development and clarification of the problem field of topic raised) and the educational process in the system of training the students of different levels and majors (philosophy, axiology, andragogy, cultural studies, socio-humanitarian directions, etc.).

Keywords: values; postnonclassics; scientific knowledge; postnonclassical picture of the world; dichotomy.

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Introduction

At the turn of the XX–XXI centuries, the world was overwhelmed by a series of sweeping changes, which can be called a transition to the postnonclassical stage. At the

same time, the postnonclassical reality has manifested itself in all spheres of human and social life – in politics, law, ideology, economy, artistic and religious life. The most general assessment of these qualitative changes

consists in recognizing the crisis state of the entire midst of social life, as well as all its levels and layers. And this is a very revealing fact, since the problem begins to actualize the scientific interest of researchers, as a rule, in a context of breaking traditional standards of thinking.

1. Postnonclassical Science

1.1. Definition of Postnonclassics

Let us first consider what postnonclassics is and what distinguishes it from classics and nonclassics. Broadly speaking, the classics is a relevant cultural exemplarity, that is, cultural patterns that were created sometime in the past but are still in use in the present. Postnonclassics is either a distinction from classical exemplars or a rejection of them. Postnonclassics is respectively what follows after nonclassics, either in a derivative form or not. From this we can distinguish four types of postnonclassics [1]:

- 1) Postnonclassics – that's what is derived from nonclassics as a difference from it;
- 2) postnonclassics – that's what is derived from nonclassics as a rejection of it;
- 3) postnonclassics – that's what arises after nonclassics as a distinction from classics;
- 4) postnonclassics – that's what arises after nonclassics as a rejection of classics.

As a direction of science, postnonclassics emerges at the end of the twentieth century in the tasks of describing complex, evolving, developing systems and processes that can be defined in different ways. Thus, the subject of observation inevitably appears. It is endowed not only with sensory organs and instruments, analyzed by empiriocritics but also with social and cultural, psychological sphere. This understanding of science has been obtained by society in the last hundred years. From Newtonian deterministic physics and incompatible Darwinian paradigm in biology through principles of relativity to observational tools in quantum and relativistic physics, then through the modelling of Universe evolution and the cosmological anthropic principle, the discovery of the role of dynamic chaos and emergence of evolutionary natural science to developing historical systems modelling and universal evolutionism. The core of these interdisciplinary processes today is synergetics (scientific and philosophical principle that considers nature, the world as a self-organizing complex system¹), which, however, does not mean that the methods of synergy should be

applied everywhere. In many cases the baggage of previous stages of science development of strict disciplinary knowledge is sufficient. The methods of synergetics are redundant where there is no system development.

The postnonclassics is particularly impressive in planning and decision-making, such as planning a complex, expensive experiment, whether a super accelerator of elementary particles or thermonuclear fusion station; the study of unique, one-time events, such as a flight to Mars or Halley's Comet, because we need an optimal strategy for solving urgent problems of mankind, and everyone understands it in his own way.

These are all environmental problems in which the human factor plays a crucial role. This is the economy, in which the needs, psychology, way of life of people must be taken into account. It is any process where the role of an observer-participant is relevant. That is why synergetics is sometimes called the basis of postnonclassical science.

1.2. Features of Postnonclassical Science

To understand the difference between classics, nonclassics, and postnonclassics, let us turn to the typology of scientific rationality proposed by the Russian philosopher V. S. Stepin in 1989, within which he identifies three stages in the science development [2]:

- 1) classical;
- 2) non-classical;
- 3) postnonclassical.

According to the author one of the criteria to distinguish classical, nonclassical and postnonclassical rationality is the type of systemic organization of the objects being mastered [3]. For mastering the objects organized as simple systems, classical rationality is sufficient. The nonclassical type of rationality provides the mastery of complex self-regulating systems, while the postnonclassical type provides the mastery of complex, self-developing systems.

Moreover, each stage is characterized by its own system of ideals and norms of research. "If we schematically represent this activity as a relationship" "subject – means – object" (including understanding the value-purpose structures of activity), then the described stages of the science evolution can be characterized by different depth of moral reflection in relation to scientific activity itself" [4].

For example, during the classical stage of scientific knowledge formation, the standards and norms of

¹ The Big Explanatory Dictionary of the Russian Language: A-Ya / RAS. Research Institute for Linguistics; Compiled by Chief Editor, Candidate Sc. Philology, S. A. Kuznetsov. – SPb.: Norint. – 1998. – P. 1534.

knowledge justification, arising on the basis of “breaking” the worldview of medieval thinking and the gradual establishment of a new understanding of nature, human and the goals of cognition, were approved. If the medieval scientist did not consider experience as a criterion of the truth of knowledge, for the New Age science the main goal of cognition lies in the study and disclosure of natural properties and relations of objects, primarily based on the experiment findings.

Here, the object of cognition is the focus of attention of the scientist of the classical period, and everything that relates to the subject, means and its activity is completely excluded. The exclusion of subjective characteristics from the process of cognition consisted in the removal of all higher meanings from the context of science and was the main condition for obtaining objective-true knowledge about the world of that period. That is, a reality was formed in which human was “thrown out” of nature or opposed to it [5].

The general scientific picture of the world of non-classical science was no longer seen as an exact copy of nature but as “a constantly refined system of relatively true knowledge about the world. The ideas about the activity of the subject of knowledge changed accordingly. It was no longer seen” “as distanced from the world under study but as being within it, and determined by it” [6]. As a result of the rethinking of the subject’s role in scientific knowledge, there emerges an awareness that “nature’s answers to our questions are determined not only by the structure of nature itself but also by the way we pose questions, which depends on the historical development of the means and methods of cognitive activity” [7]. That is, we can say that within the framework of this stage of scientific knowledge there is a strengthening of the relation between the knowledge about the object and the nature of the means and activity, and it is considered as the conditions of objective and true description and explanation of the world. But the connections between intrascientific and moral, humanitarian values are still not the subject of scientific reflection, although implicitly they determine the character of knowledge. In other words, nonclassical science (sociology in particular) is primarily a Neo-Kantian program of justification of social and humanitarian knowledge [8], since it is most characterized by “methodologicalism”, which just defines this period specificity in Stepin’s understanding. The representatives of the postnonclassics have been already trying to justify the practical attitude to the object by

restoring the rationality of everyday life, which preceded objectifying reflection.

The following attributes of the postnonclassical science can be attributed to the features of the postnonclassical stage:

- change in the nature of scientific activity due to the revolution in the means of knowledge acquisition and storage (science computerization, merging of science with industrial production, etc.);
- spread of interdisciplinary research and integrated research programs;
- increased importance of economic and sociopolitical factors and goals;
- change of the object itself – open self-developing systems; inclusion of axiological factors in the explanatory statements;
- use of humanities methods in natural science, in particular the historical reconstruction principle.

Postnonclassical science indicates that the researcher and the research subject – the subject and the object – belong to a broader class of phenomena. That is, in addition to the reality in which the subject and the object are separated, there is another reality where both are not opposed to each other; the activity of the subject is not aimed at the object. Furthermore, there is a reality in which both the subject and the object are objects. Hence we can conclude that the modern postnonclassical stage of science development is associated with the search for the intersection of the subjective and the objective, as a result of which the absolute observer, any principles of prohibition imposed by the subject on nature are gone. And an era of dialogue is coming, when the subject and the object take on a common style, becoming equal.

In the categorical grid of the postnonclassical picture of the world a special importance is being attached to such concepts as instability, non-equilibrium, non-linearity, irreversibility, self-organization, co-evolution, etc., which, if they were applied to study the world in classical and nonclassical science, were not of key importance, especially this concerns the social form of global evolutionism, which are associated with the application of a number of other categories, actually associated with the specific features of exactly social evolutionism.

The objects of research in postnonclassical science are unique, complex, historically evolving systems that interact with the environment and share substance, energy, and information. In other words, open and self-organizing systems play the dominant role. Of particular

importance among them are “man-sized complexes” [9] – natural systems in which humans are actively involved, ranging from ecological, informational, medical and biological to axiological objects and processes. There is a change in the concepts of reality itself, from empirical to theoretical reality, that is, to the world of constructs, models, and theories. Reality is now seen as a fragment of a new synthetic universe.

A new type of science is associated with such notions as self-renewal, self-organization, and self-determination; the systematic interrelationship of natural dynamics in space and time is gradually recognized; the role of fluctuations abolishing the law of large numbers and thus giving the individual with his creative imagination a chance, is highlighted. As a result, there is an increasing emphasis on the openness, the creative nature of evolution, in which neither the individual structures that arise and perish nor the final outcome are predetermined.

2. Values in the Postnonclassical Picture of the World

2.1. The concept of “value” in the works of Russian and foreign authors

Since scientific knowledge at each stage of its development is determined inter alia by the general state of culture of a given historical era, it should be considered in the context of values and paradigms. Upon that, the simultaneity of the emergence of the concept of “value”, on the one hand, and of the principle of the subject-object dichotomy, on the other hand, makes us wonder about their interrelation.

One of the problems concerning the conceptual moments of defining the meaning of the concept “value” in the postnonclassical picture of the world is attributed to the fact that this concept is characterized by a certain linguistic duality. The point is that in this case, the understanding of values contemplates their acceptance as some attribute, as a value of something, because without such clarification this concept becomes insane. The object of philosophical analysis in this situation represents in the ethical sense a value in itself. It is worth noting that in such a situation the objects themselves have value or these objects will be values. Thus, for example, some researchers assume the consideration of the values in different cultures from the distinction of a particular value, or the values of a particular culture, which serves as a basis for individual choices and value judgments. At the same time, in the postnonclassical social reality there is a constant evaluation of events in the world around us, substance of be-

havior, human activities, ideas, and the like. Therefore, the value approach to the phenomena of society and nature here is related to the results of activity and involves the selection of the objects of evaluation, what is necessary for the existence and satisfaction of human needs. Next, let us consider some authors in more detail.

The second half of the XX century was marked by a sharp intensification of the technocratization of social consciousness, on the one hand, and an increase in the opposing humanist trend, on the other hand. This was expressed, in particular, in a new appeal to existential ideas, which, in contrast to the era of world wars, became not an experience of meaninglessness and pessimism about external values but rather an optimistic attempt to preserve freedom for the subject, despite the dominance of the external factor of the constant growth of consumption. One of the options for solving this problem was proposed by the psychologist and philosopher V. Frankl [10], the founder of the method of logotherapy, or existential psychotherapy. The concepts of value and meaning play a key role in the philosophical foundation of this method aimed at filling the “existential vacuum” in the soul of a modern man who has lost the instincts and traditions that in the past gave him security and idea-driven set course. Frankl believes that the existence of meanings and values is objective but is seen by individuals as unique. He criticizes the theory of understanding values as the self-expression of individuality (Sartre, Camus [11; 12]) or the self-expression of humanity as a whole (Jung [13]), arguing that then values could not call man further than he is. At the same time, Frankl retains the idea of uniqueness in relation to the experience and interpretation of values and meanings, noting that uniqueness does not simply mean the relativity of meanings but is “the quality not only of the situation but also of life as a whole, since life is a stream of unique situations [14]. The concepts of meaning and value in his theory are extremely close and are distinguished as follows: “values can be defined as those universals of meaning with which society, if not all of humanity, is confronted”. What today, according to Frankl, is the unique meaning of an individual’s life, may become a universal value tomorrow. That is, values are objectified and supported the meanings found by individuals in unique situations. The perception of universal values facilitates an individual’s internal search for “meaning because” at least in typical situations he is out of decision-making. The philosopher points out that modern society is character-

ized by the absence of universal values, their creativity is decreasing, which at the same time does not reduce the possibility of creation of unique meanings. Frankl's classification of values is of interest. It distinguishes "values of creativity", "values of experience", and "values of attitude". These groups reflect the three main directions in which an individual can find life purpose. The first relates to what the individual gives to the world in his creations, the second one – to what he takes from the world in his encounters and experiences, and the third one – to what place he takes in relation to his situation in the event that he cannot change his destiny. This classification expresses the subject-object essence of value as precisely as possible, not reducing it to pure relationality but giving the moment of "relation" a key guiding role. Despite the tendency toward objectivism in interpreting the world of values, Frankl keeps the subject completely free to choose, to experience uniquely and to intertwine with the creation of meanings [15]. It is also indicative that in this case, axiology finds an intersection of psychology, medicine, anthropology, and ontology, which points to the tendency to the practical interpretation of the fundamental problems of the personal existence on the one hand, and the inevitable ontologization of spiritual and ethical issues on the other. Modern society is approaching a stage of development where the values and meanings of individual existence can affect (and already do affect) the existence of humanity and nature as a whole, which inevitably leads to the need to solve the problem of the meaning of existence from the position of universality.

Another contemporary psychologist, A. Maslow, also addresses the problem of personal values in the context of the existential tradition, although he does not fully share it. He believes that values are not a project or invention of the individual but "they are inherent in the structure of human nature itself; they have a biological and genetic basis and are developed in culture" [16]. Considering the values as a result of an individual's mental characteristics and health, Maslow outlines homeostatic values (peace, heartsease, sleep, rest, protection, recession, and even death wish) as a special group, calling them "immature" or "borderline" values [17]. He argues that such values are not central to a healthy person. The highest human nature does not aspire to homeostasis but to personal empowerment, he argues, so it is distinguished by its conation to "B-values" or values of Objective Reality. Maslow seeks to link psychological theory

and ontology and concludes that the values of reality are directly relevant to the mental health of the individual. These values are not constructed but "discovered" by the subject in their higher nature, so their comprehension is part of personal empowerment that Maslow considers life purpose. B-values, values (truth, divinity, beauty, integrity, vitality, uniqueness, perfection, etc.) can fill the individual's existence with the meaning that religions in ancient times gave and that must be found independently in the age of positivism and scientific progress. Maslow compares growth values and regressive values and concludes that "good culture" should allow the satisfaction of higher needs as well as lower ones. Existential psychology and psychotherapy are probably proving increasingly relevant today due to the fact that modern society itself has proven to be sick. The appeal to the search for meanings and values as a method of finding mental health and harmony is in many ways similar to Eastern psychopractices (such as Buddhism or Chan Buddhism), and the appeal to them testifies to the crisis of the Western methodology and at the same time to its openness.

E. Fromm pays great attention to the analysis of values, both in the logical and in the historical-philosophical aspect in his work "The Revolution of Hope" [18]. In his reasoning, he proceeds from the division of values into those "which an individual considers as values himself, consciously evaluating his life" and "objective values", which he is unconsciously guided by. The main contradiction and problem, according to the philosopher, is that unconscious values arising from an individual's social life directly determine his being, while conscious values are "ineffective". Understanding how to act and wishing to do so, the individual is forced to act according to officially recognized standards and norms. As for the nature of conscious or higher values, Fromm relates it to revelation, noting that for the Western man it is the revelation of God, while for Buddhism higher values were not related to the revelation of a Higher Being. In this religious system, he suggests, the hierarchy of values "was available to everyone without any condition concerning rational thought or human feelings", and was comprehended through meditation.

Fromm analyzes various theories explaining the nature of values, in particular Sartre's theory of freedom [19], and social and biological determinism, pointing out their shortcomings. He associates his own position on this issue with the continuation of A. Schweitzer's tradition. Schweitzer [20], described in his work "Veneration of Life". From the point of view of this notion, the

valuable is claimed to be that which is demanded by life itself and in doing so contributes to the fullest disclosure of all traditions, we note that it can also be dangerous to a certain extent. The unfolding of “all human capabilities” can sometimes not promote but contradict life, so self-realization and the fulfillment of all possibilities, in our opinion, must proceed from the unconditional value of life, including life of another, as well as his freedom.

According to Fromm, the values chosen by the individual are closely related to his existence (existence is not identical with material existence but includes spiritual life). There are a great many alternatives, and the individual chooses the structure that best suits his character. Thus, Fromm links the nature of values to objective factors (revelation, sociality, economic life) and their choice to subjectivity, the inner, above all psychological, features of the identity. But if we ask ourselves what our choices are formed by – our genetic program, morality, the unconscious “it” or mind – Fromm’s theory will not give us a definite answer. On the whole, his approach can be assessed as another attempt to combine objective and subjective factors in the structure of value as developed in the humanistic tradition. It should be noted that it is Fromm who pays considerable attention to the study of the values of modern industrial society, not only from a position of criticism but also from a position of hope for their qualitative change.

In his turn, G. Marcuse [21] fairly combines the process of civilization formation and the change in the value system of a man, who lived as part of nature. In his opinion, the transition to a new quality is facilitated by “instinctive values, that is, the principles that contribute to these goals achievement. Changes in the system of values lead humanity to a new stage of existence, where there is a rejection of comprehensive satisfaction of needs to conscious control over them.

In the seventies of the XX century, the interest in axiological problems in Western philosophy increased sharply. Against the background of criticism of naturalism, intuitionism, and emotivism there were formed approaches striving for a holistic, comprehensive coverage of the problem of nature of value, for overcoming the contradictions that arose within the framework of one or another separate tradition. The Polish researcher T. Stychen notes that “the modern state of discourse concerning the understanding of axiology, value and a way of its cognition

with good reason is characterized as a state of dead end” [22], according to the philosopher the reason of it consists in too narrowed theory of reality which automatically is accepted as a general field of dispute. Attempts to solve this problem have been made by many Western thinkers. In particular, Glenn M. Vernon [23] offered an explanation of nature of value in the context of the concept of symbolic interactive interaction. He substantiated the two-in-one essence of value, which “first, is a sign (label), second, the meaningfulness”, and when values change, symbolic names are preserved. The comprehension of empirical and non-empirical symbols takes place in experiential, rational and super-empirical ways, respectively, and their reality for the subject is completely unrelated to scientific evidence. Vernon believes that symbols are the constructs of consciousness that underlie the worldview, and values are a variant of their justification by the individual as meaningful and determining behavior. The main thing about values is that they act as an expression of the individual and his vision of the world in external reality: “When I create values, the phenomenon of evaluation manifests itself”, I indirectly communicate something about myself to my audience. Vernon fairly points out that scientific knowledge is helpless in comprehending symbolic reality, just as it is powerless in investigating value, unlike the value definitions that it has traditionally dealt with. A similar approach is taken by R. Brunbau¹, who notes that the basis of value is an “intuitive requirement” and therefore all attempts to identify it logically will inevitably encounter insoluble difficulties.

One of the most circumstantial conceptions of value in recent decades, R. Hartman’s “Formal Axiology” [24], is based on the identification of value and significance. If logically the significance of a thing is defined as a set of predicates characterizing it, and the set of predicates is “the completeness of the content of a thing”, then “a thing has value to the extent to which its completeness is the richest”. Formal axiology as a qualification of qualities proceeds from the logical nature of value, called by R. Hartman, the completeness of content, and from the structure of this completeness as a set of predicates. This allows the author to refer his concept to theory of sets, similar to mathematical. Thus, he concludes that formal axiology is “an objective and aprioristic science, and its regulation is based on objective standards”. How can the quality of value be measured? R. Hartman is convinced

¹ Global Problems and Universal Human Values: A Collection. // – M. 1990. – P. 247.

that this measure is the “completeness” (intension) of a thing: “The measure of value of a thing is, therefore, the logical completeness of a thing; the thing that has more elements that fill it, and which correspond to the totality of all the properties contained in the thing, is the best”. According to the theory of sets the completeness as a measure of value consists of cosets, and each of the cosets is the value of a thing. Valuation, according to R. Hartman, organizes or disorganizes the properties of a thing, which makes the vision of a thing more agile, and more dynamic than stable. This concept is filled with the desire to present value as an objective phenomenon, which, on the one hand, would allow us to examine it from the position of formal logic and, on the other hand, to rationalize its components, functions, and attributes.

In turn, another modern philosopher W. Werkmeister believes that the modern crisis of theories of value is connected with the fact that each of them absolutizes the role of feelings or relations in the value content, while “only feelings and relations together constitute the experience of value” [25]. He believes that man’s existence owes to his ability to create the values of certain things and phenomena, so it is not the material conditions that act as primary for his being but the creativity of cultural samples that strive to realize the values. In this regard, he calls the future “a manifestation of the highest values” of humanity as “the conjunction of its aspirations, its goals in the perspective of its way toward personal self-justification”. His research is notable for the firm conviction that there can be no harmonious existence without the value experience consideration but that the values themselves must be deeply understood and weighed.

According to R. Frondizi, the value is a “Gestalt quality” that should not be separated from empirical properties but nevertheless “cannot be reduced to them” [26]. According to Frondizi, value cannot be presented as the sum of its components, objective and subjective, it is like a “symphony orchestra”, an “organic unity or Gestalt”. At the same time, the thinker emphasizes that values do not exist in a vacuum, they are always situational, the result of a certain individual experience and depend both on the individual himself and on the goal, conditions, and era. The author concludes that axiological development enrichment is determined by the constant manifestation of human imagination, thinking and activity. R. Hartman believed that there is an insoluble contradiction between unreal values and reality situations, R. Frondizi, in turn, points out that values are embodied in real objects that

are “always open” to it. Regarding the hierarchy of values, Frondizi proves that it cannot be linear and vertical, like ranks in the army, it can only be the result of a very complex relationship of values, which will change depending on the subject condition, his needs, abilities, his attitude to the object, the situation of the society in which he lives. And this is one of those conclusions, which, in our opinion, should certainly be taken into account by modern researchers of value.

K. Bayer believes that the main difficulties of modern axiology are due to the imperfection of the conceptual questions. According to him, the world of value includes two types of essentially different phenomena: “value assessment” and “value imputation”. The first can be measured by the ability of beings themselves, including the individual, to appropriate goods, and the second – is measured by willful aspiration, the ability of the individual to achieve the end result [27]. In his opinion, the attention to the study of values must grow, since it is now clear that comprehensive responsibility relates to the fact that values play a leading role in determining human behavior.

According to Bayer, a positive worldview can be based on the fact that the subject is capable not only of evaluating existence but also of changing things in compliance with his own interests, thanks to which he is ultimately the determinant of the existence of things.

Another modern researcher, M. Scriven [28], notes that values in the broad sense are the result of need, and in the narrow sense is the result of attraction. Therefore, contemporary methodological discussions of value are only “a certain unconscious picture of the relationship between value judgments (opposed to the intrinsic nature)”, which lead to a distortion of reality.

In turn, C. Hall considers values to be a “measure of the fullness” of an object [29]. He points out that when we talk about the superiority of values compared to private ideas or feelings, we understand that ideas or feelings to a large extent provoke and determine the orientation of behavior according to “value vector”.

P. Merton [30] considers values in the context of the ethos of science. From his point of view, only an emotionally colored set of values and norms can be called an ethos of science. These norms manifest themselves as injunctions, prohibitions, permissions, and preferences, which are “legitimized” in institutional terms (communalism, universalism, disinterestedness, organized scepticism), thus forming a scientific conscience. That is, ethnicity, like the social system of norms and values in

general, is supported by feelings and emotions of those to whom they apply. Any violation of it entails indignation, disrespect and other negative forms of emotions on the part of society.

The modern American scientist H. Lacy [31] also reflects on values. For him values represent the good that a man strives for all his life, this quality that gives meaning and perfection to life, this strategy of behavior, to which all others are equal. Moreover, the values require regulatory control, and a mismatch between a person's (social groups or social institutions) values in words and actions can exist because of incorrect self-assessment. Therefore, H. Lacy makes recommendations for their reconciliation, highlighting several behavioral strategies to adapt to social values – adapting goals to reality, resigning to survival values, creative marginality, aspiration for power, transformation from below (creating public forms of participation).

Despite the fact that in the studies of domestic philosophers and thinkers of the second half of the XIX century and early XX century, the universal human values were recognized as fundamental qualities in the formation of personality, and this reasoning is based on the works of outstanding national thinkers, such as S. N. Bulgakov, I. A. Ilyin, A. F. Losev, N. K. Roerich and others, harmonizing Western European and domestic views on the axiological component of social being [32]. The ideological dogmas of the XX century of the Soviet period concerning the development of Russian scientific thought have made significant adjustments in the understanding and interpretation of the “values” concept. The problem of values was considered from a certain angle in domestic philosophy and the humanities and social studies for a long period of time due to the known ideological reasons. Only towards the end of the XX century and the beginning of the XXI century there is a kind of “axiological breakthrough”, and the problem of values is discussed by a wide range of philosophers, scientists, and practitioners. Universal value concepts dominate in their works, as well as the studies focusing on the historical analysis of axiology – the development of the value-cultural approach. Thus, V. K. Shokhin reduces the world of values only to personal values, which become perpetuated only “in personal subjective being” and characterize the deep level of relevance-for-someone, but are universal and common to humanity [33]. L. V. Baeva, on the contrary, does not absolutize individual values, but defines them as “a special type of information reflecting the subject

uniqueness and expressing the most significant aspirations for self-improvement of its quality” [34].

At the same time, if we compare the works of domestic and foreign authors, we will see that domestic philosophy traditionally considers the values of science, while foreign philosophy – especially English-language – forms the philosophy of virtue.

2.2. Values and the Subject-Object Dichotomy

Thus, we see that the very fact of the connection between the concept of “value” and the principle of the subject-object dichotomy does exist [35]. But what is the genesis and character of this relation?

It is worth noting that the most active application of the principle of dichotomy (the principle of pair division, which consists in the fact that each partner has no common features with the other) found in the works of D. Hume. For example, in his “Treatise on Human Nature” (1739), he noted the impossibility of moving from “there is” (descriptive) judgments to “must” (prescriptive) judgments solely on the basis of logic [36]. The principle is indicative of the fact that the validity of general propositions may not be deduced from facts in a strictly logical way. It later came to be called the Hume principle or “Hume’s Guillotine”, but it had little effect on the structure of ethical and humanistic thought as a whole, since psychological persuasive power in ethics and life practice dominates logical correctness [37].

In this context the reasoning of the modern domestic scientists Yu. V. Perov, V. Yu. Perov and P. P. Gaidenko is interesting. Thus Yu. V. Perov and V. Yu. Perov note that the value attitude and thinking in values are formed exclusively on the basis of the subject-object relation as a type of this relation; and values, in turn, are derived from this relation. They also believe that the entire philosophy of values could only have developed on the basis of the subjective principle of New European metaphysics with its basic subject-object relation as the result of the development and consistent universalization of this subjective principle [38]. However, this point of view still needs to be clarified.

P. P. Gaidenko took a different path. In her reasoning, she separates being and oughtness, which is the premise of the theory of values. If in axiology the thesis about the identity of these two notions in the Antiquity and Middle Ages and the subsequent separation of being and values is generally accepted, P. P. Gaidenko sees the main difference between values and the ancient and medieval concept of good in the fact that value refers to the subject of pure will, that is, to the “going beyond” subject whose

status ensures general significance of values. And since values belong to the field of practical reason, they do not have a being that is irrelevant to the transcendental subject: they have only significance, that is, “the essence of demands, commands, appeal to will, the goal set” [39].

This conclusion, however, is also quite contentious, as it inevitably turns everything that falls within the subject’s attention including a man with his ideals and desires, into an object of external aspirations and manipulations. This just becomes the basis of this attitude when there is a total alienation of man from nature, society and he himself, turning him from a self-valuable subject into an object of social technologies. Here, as another domestic scientist G. P. Vyzhletsov says, “to have” instead of “to be”, “to exist” instead of “to live”, “to obey” instead of “to create” begin to prevail [40]. That is, in this case, one must always keep in mind that the meaning of any human value, and much less spiritual value includes the “proper”, the “desirable”, the “norm”, the “goal” and the “ideal”, along with the “significant”.

Conclusions

From all has been said it follows that a peculiarity of the postnonclassics is setting for combining cognitive and various kinds of general social values and goals. Thus, in the process of determining scientific and research priorities, along with cognitive values, spiritual values, and goals themselves, goals of economic and political nature begin to play ever-growing role. However, practical decisions making schemes are still on a massive scale based on notions of rationality that do not represent the value aspects of.

In postnonclassical science, there is a transition from the ideal of value-neutral research consisting in setting for searching the only objective truth, the answers to questions that deal with “human-like” objects and therefore

suppose a value-based background knowledge. Therefore, the answers we are looking for are, in one way or another, value-laden. They include variable conditions and boundaries of admissible interference into the object, and, consequently, the system of prohibitions or limitations on certain algorithms of cognition-creation, capable of generating threats to the values and goals, accepted as basic. There are ideas evolving from the traditional scholastic attitude, according to which a man is seen as part of an established world order in which all things are governed by a higher being, where “a fixed order of values completely independent of any subjective decision” reigns, and where a man himself is interpreted in terms of his orientation toward an absolute realm of values and essences that are mastered as a result of active creativity. On the other hand, a new type of philosophizing emerges at the end of the XX century, emphasizing moments of individuality, freedom, and asserting the independence of personal being and the world of values, seeking, in turn, transcendence and communication. The interinfluence and collision of these approaches constitute the peculiarity of the modern axiological vision of the world.

Taking all the aforesaid into consideration, we can say that the development of the concept of postnonclassics in the context of values poses many interesting and important challenges to representatives of various sciences and scientific disciplines. This requires both self-organization of academic community and interdisciplinary approaches, brings to a new level of scientific search and empirical research on the implementation of the value approach in the educational process of higher education, in the managerial sphere of economy, political sphere and public administration, in all aspects of a human being.

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